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Case No. 890120

Defendants/Appellees.
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This is an appeal from a Summary Judgment entered in favor
of Defendant/Appellee

Rex Jackson, dated January

30, 1989 and

from a Summary Judgment entered in favor of Defendants/Appellees
Southgate Golf Course, John LaGant and John Willie, dated March
22, 1989.

To the extent necessary, both Summary Judgments have

been certified final under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Statutory jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court

because this is an appeal from the judgment of a district court
over which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate
jurisdiction.
1989) .

Utah Code Ann.

§§ 78-2-2 (3) (j) ; 78-2a-3

(Supp.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the lower court err

in determining

that Jackson,

LaGant and Willie were vendors of the golf course and, therefore,
were not liable as a matter of law for defects in their design or
construction of the golf course which existed as of the date of
its sale to Southgate?
2.

Did the lower court err in dismissing the action against

Jackson, LaGant and Willie as being time barred under the statute
of

limitations, when

said

individuals

had

failed

to

properly

raise the defense of the statute of limitations as required under
Pules 9(h) and 12(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure?
3.

Is

Section

78-12-25.5

as

applied

in

this

case

unconstitutional under Article I f Section 11 of the Constitution
of Utah?
4.

Is

Section

78-12-25.5

as

applied

in

this

case

unconstitutional under Article I, Section 24 of the Constitution
of Utah or unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection under
Amendment 14 of the Constitution of the United States of America?
5.

Did the lower court err in determining that there is no

genuine issue of material fact as to whether Southgate knew or
should have known of any defect in the subject golf course?
6.

Did the lower court err in determining that there was no

genuine issue of material fact as to Southgate!s negligence as to
any

of

the

other

particulars

alleged

Complaint?

2

in

the

Second

Amended

TEXT OF AUTHORITIES
1. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall
set
forth
affirmatively
accord
and
satisfaction,
arbitration and award, assumption of risk, contributory
negligence, discharge and bankruptcy, duress, estoppel,
failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by
fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, res
judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations,
waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance
or affirmative defense.
Utah R. Civ. P. 8 (c) .
2. In pleading the statute of limitations it is not
necessary to state the facts showing the defense but it
may be alleged generally that the cause of action is
barred by the provisions of the statute relied on,
referring to or describing such statutes specifically
and
definitely
by
section
number,
subsection
designation, if any, or otherwise designating the
provision relied upon sufficiently clearly to identify
it.
Utah R. Civ. P. 9 (h) .
3. A party waives all defenses and objections which he
does not present either by motion as hereinbefore
provided or, if he has made no motion, in his answer or
reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense
of failure to join an indispensable party, and the
objection of failure to state legal defense to a claim
may also be made by a later pleading, if one is
permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings
or at the trial on the merits and except (2) that,
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or
otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the
subject-matter, the court shall dismiss the action.
Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h).
4. (1) (a) An action to recover damages for any injury
to property, real or personal, or for any injury to the
person, or for bodily injury or wrongful death, arising
out of the defective and unsafe condition of an
improvement to real property, or any action for damages
sustained on account of the injury, may not be brought
against any person performing or furnishing the design,
planning, surveying, supervising the construction of,
or constructing the improvement to real property more
than seven years after the completion of construction.
3

(2) The time limitation imposed by this section
does not apply to any person in actual possession and
control
as owner, tenant, or otherwise, of the
improvement at the time the defective and unsafe
condition of the improvement constitutes the proximate
cause of the injury for which an action is brought.
(3)
This section does not extend or limit the
periods otherwise prescribed by state law for the
brining of any action.
(4) As used in this section:
(a)
"Person"
means
an
individual,
corporation, partnership, or other legal entity.
(b) "Completion of construction" means the
date of issuance of a certificate of substantial
completion by the owner, architect, engineer, or
other agent, or the date of the owner's use or
possession of the improvement on real property.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (Supp. 1989).
5. All courts shall be open, and every person, for an
injury done to him in his person, property or
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law,
which
shall
be
administered
without
denial
or
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which
he is a party.
Utah Const, art I, § 11.
6.
"All laws of a general nature
operation." Utah Const, art I, § 24.

shall

have

uniform

7.
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
U.S. Const, amend XIV, § 1.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 5, 1986, while golfing at Southgate Golf Course in
St. George, Utah, Plaintiff was struck in the face and personally
4

injured

by

an

errant

golf

(hereinafter "Thomas").

ball

hit

by

Defendant

Ike

Second Amended Complaint 1 10.

Thomas
(R. vol.

I, pp. 302-03; Addendum [hereinafter "A."] 2-3).
Plaintiff brought this action against Thomas claiming he was
negligent

in

Plaintiff

causing

alleged

(hereinafter

the ball
that

to

strike

Defendant

Plaintiff.

Southgate

"Southgate"), the owner

Further,

Golf

Course

and operator of the golf

course where the incident occurred, was negligent in failing to
erect an appropriate barrier that would have prevented the ball
from striking Plaintiff, in failing to warn Plaintiff and other
golf course patrons of the danger posed by the configuration of
the

golf

course

precautions
Plaintiff

and

for

failing

to

for the safety of Plaintiff

named

the

previous

owner

and

course, Lava Hills Resort Corporation
and

Rex

Jackson,

respectively,
shareholders

take

John

LaGant

and

principals

of

appropriate

and others.
operator

of

Finally,
the

golf

(hereinafter "Lava Hills")
John

"Jackson," "LaGant," and
and

other

Lava

Willie

(hereinafter,

"Willie"), three
Hills, who

former

performed

or

participated in the design and construction of the golf course.
Id., M

12-15 (R. vol. I, pp. 303-04; A. 3-4).

Plaintiff claimed that Lava Hills and Jackson, LaGant and
Willie were negligent in failing to safely design the golf course
to

prevent

injury

to

Plaintiff

and

others,

that

they

were

negligent in failing to safely construct the golf course so as to
prevent injury to Plaintiff and others and, finally that they
were

negligent

in

failing

to

inform
5

Southgate

and

any

other

successors in interest of any latent defects they knew or should
have known existed at the golf course that could cause injury to
Id,, tt

Plaintiff and others.

16-17 (R. vol, I, p. 304; A. 4 ) ,

Plaintiff settled her claims against Thomas and, therefore,
he is not a party to this appeal.

Furthermore, Lava Hills has

been dissolved and, therefore, is not an active party to this
action or this appeal.

Summary Judgment dated March 22, 1989,

M

5-6 (R. vol. II, pp. 276-66; A. 64-65).
On

January

30,

1989,

after

hearing

oral

argument,

the

district court entered Summary Judgment in favor of Jackson on
the grounds that Jackson was a vendor of the golf course and was
not subject to liability as of the date the vendee, Southgate,
took possession of it.

Summary Judgment dated January 30, 1989

(R. vol. II, pp. 215-16; A. 55-56); Order Granting Defendant Rex
Jackson's

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment;

Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions of Law (hereinafter "Findings") , Conclusions of Law,
M

1-3 (R. vol. II, pp. 212-13; A. 52-53).
On March 22, 1989, after hearing oral argument, the district

court denied a Motion to Vacate the Summary Judgment in favor of
Jackson on the additional ground that said action was not timely
under

the

Judgment

statute
in

favor

of

limitations

of LaGant

and

further

and Willie

on

granted

the

Summary

same grounds.

Also, the Court granted Summary Judgment in favor of Southgate on
the

grounds

that

Plaintiff

had

failed

to

demonstrate

that

Southgate knew or should have known of any defect in the golf
course and was negligent.

Conclusions of Law Underlying Summary

Judgment (R. vol. II, pp. 270-73; A. 58-61).
6

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 5, 1986, Plaintiff was golfing at Southgate Golf
Course in St. Georgef Utah.

At approximately 12:15 p.m. that day

she was standing on the tee-box of the 15th hole of the golf
course waiting her turn to make her

first shot from the tee.

While standing in that area, Thomas, who was making his first
shot from the tee area of the 14th hole, caused

the ball to

deviate from its straight path and fly to the right (slice) and
strike Plaintiff

in the face where she was standing.

The tee

boxes of the 14th and 15th holes were designed and constructed
such that Plaintiff would have been standing approximately 50 to
7 5 yards in front of and to the right of where Thomas struck the
ball.

Second Amended Complaint M

8-10

(R. vol. I, pp. 302; A.

2); Findings <l 1 (R. vol. II, pp. 209-10; A. 49-50).
At the time of the accident, the golf course was owned art
operated by Southgate.
some

11

months

Southgate had purchased the golf course

earlier

from

Lava

Hills.

Second

Amended

Complaint, TL 8 (R. vol. I, p. 302; A. 2 ) ; Findings, $5 2-3 (R.
vol. II, pp. 209-210; A. 49-50).
After taking possession of the golf course, but prior to the
accident that is the subject of this action, Southgate redesigned
and modified the 14th hole of the golf course by moving the green
some 130 feet closer to the tee and to the left of the previous
green location.
15th hole.

Southgate made no change to the design of the

Second Amended Complaint f 9 (R. vol. I, p. 302; A.

2); Findings, f 5 (R. vol. II, 210; A. 50).
7

Jackson, LaGant and Willie were involved

in the initial

design and construction of the golf course in the spring and
summer of 1975.

Willie was the primary designer of the course,

with the assistance of LaGant.

In its original design, it was

intended that there would be a natural barrier
the 14th and 15th tees.

(trees) between

Jackson, who supervised

the actual

construction of the golf course, failed to install the trees.
Affidavit of John Willie (hereinafter "Willie Affidavit") 15 5-6,
8-9, 12-14 (R. vol. I, pp. 260-61; A. 14-15).
After designing and constructing the golf course, Jackson,
LaGant and Willie all eventually ceased active association with
its operation.

After construction was completed, Jackson and

Willie maintained only a shareholder's interest in Lava Hills
until the golf course was sold to Southgate.

LaGant sold his

entire interest in December 1984, prior to the sale.

Willie

Affidavit f 4 (R. vol. I, p. 260; A. 14); Affidavit of Rex
Jackson, f 3 (R. vol. I, p. 216; A. 20); Affidavit of John LaGant
t 4 (R. vol. II, p. 75; A. 11).
Plaintiff's expert, David Rainville, a golf course architect
from Orange County, California, has expressed his opinion, by
affidavit, that the golf course was defective

in design and

construction in that there was no natural or artificial barrier
between the 14th and 15th holes.

He stated that such defective

condition still existed on April 5, 1986, after the modifications
by Southgate.

Affidavit of David A. Rainville 1 11 & Exhibit L

(R. vol. I, pp. 116-117, 131; A. 33, 38-39).
8

Two principals
Atkinf

by

of

affidavit

in

Southgate, Richard
support

of

their

Schmutz

and William

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment, first state that there is no defect in the design or
construction of the golf course.

Then, both state that both the

layout and the proximity and location of the two tee boxes was
patent and easily observable by any patron of the golf course,
including Plaintiff.

Finally, in its Findings of Fact in Support

of the Summary Judgment in Favor of Jackson, the Court finds that
if there is a defect in the course, "such defect could have been
discovered by Defendant Southgate through such an inspection as
would be made in the exercise of ordinary care and prudence, and
Defendant Southgate had a reasonable time to discover and remedy
any such defect or dangerous condition prior to the occurrence of
Plaintiff's accident."

Affidavit of Richard Schmutz in Support

of Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter "Schmutz Affidavit") ,
i5 8-9
Support

(R, vol. I, p. 81; A. 25); Affidavit of William Atkin in
of

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

(hereinafter

"Atkin

Affidavit" 55 7-8) (Supplemental Record; A. 29).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT

1:

Jackson, LaGant

and Willie

are, or

excepted from the rule stated in Preston v. Golden,

should

be

The are not

vendors, they are commercial developers, and they performed the
actual construction of the course.
liable

at

least

a

reasonable

Further, they should remain

time

after

the

reasonable time is a genuine issue of material fact.
9

sale.

Such

POINT

II;

Jackson, LaGant

and Willie

have

not

properly

raised the defense of the statute of limitations under Rules 8(c)
and

9(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Consequently,

such a defense is waived under Rule 12(h) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
POINT III;

Assuming Jackson, LaGant or Willie have properly

raised the statute of limitations defense, Section 78-12-25.5 is
unconstitutional
Constitution.

under

the

Open

Courts

Provision

of

the

Utah

Based upon the reasoning in Berry ex rel Berry v.

Beech Aircraft Corp., there is not a reasonable justification for
denying Plaintiff

and others

similarly

situated

from

a remedy

against the persons who may have created the defects in the golf
course that ultimately caused her injury.
POINT IV;

Section 75-12-25.5 is an unconstitutional denial

of equal protection as applied to Plaintiff and others similarly
situated

in her class under Article I Section 2 4 of the Utah

Constitution and Amendment 14 of the United States Constitution.
Under the doctrine set forth in Malan v. Lewis and Condemarin v.
University of Utah, there is no justifiable or reasonable basis
for denying Plaintiff and the other persons similarly
from bringing

a cause of

action because

the wrongful

situated
conduct

giving rise to the cause of action occurred more than seven years
prior to the injury.
POINT V;

The Affidavits

Atkin, along with the Finding
Summary

Judgment

in

favor

of

of

Richard

of Fact
Jackson
10

Schmutz

and

William

in connection with the
and

the

Affidavit

of

Plaintiff's expert, all raise a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether there was a latent defect in the golf course, which
caused injury to Plaintiff, and whether Southgate knew or should
have known such defect existed.
POINT VI;

Even

assuming

the

lower court was correct

in

determining, as a matter of law, that any defect in the golf
course was latent, there is still a question of fact regarding
whether

Southgate

was

negligent

in

creating

the

defect.

Plaintiff's expert has testified that the golf course as actually
modified

by

Southgate, was

construction.
whether

still defective

in its design

and

Therefore, there is still as issue of fact as to

Southgate

was

affirmatively

negligent

in

its

design

and/or construction of the modification of the 14th hole.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
PRESTON V. GOLDMAN, IF APPLICABLE, IS
DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THIS CASE
The Court below determined that under the case of Preston v.
Goldman, 42 Cal. 3d 108, 720 P.2d 476 (1986), Jackson, LaGant and
V7illie, as vendors of the golf course in May of 1985, were not
liable for any defects in the design and/or construction of the
course from the date Southgate took over possession and control
of it after its purchase of the golf course.
In Preston, a child was severly injured from a near drowning
in

a

pond

constructed

on

certain

11

residential

property.

The

child's father brought a lawsuit against both the present owners
of the property

and the previous owners who had designed

constructed

pond.

the

After

trial,

the

lower

court

and

entered

judgment on a special verdict in favor of all defendants.

On

appeal to the California Court of Appeals, plaintiff argued that
the court had failed to properly instruct the jury on the basis
for liability
Appeals

of the previous owner.

reversed

upon

The California Court of

that basis, but

the California

Supreme

Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that liability in a
landowner liability case was predicated on ownership and control
of

the property

regardless of whether

the previous owner

had

created a dangerous condition.
The

California

holding.

court made

a number

of exceptions

First, the California court stated:

to

its

"Our holding here

relates only to the liability of 'do-it-yourself1 home improvers
and

is

not

liability

of

intended

to

commercial

effect,

establish,

or

builders, contractors

or

diminish

any

renovators."

Id. 720 P.2d at 487 n.10.
Second, the court recognized that when the prior landowner
was the contractor or builder of the entire property, there are
different

rules

that

apply

that

may

hold

such

professional

developer/owner liable even after he has sold the property.

Id.,

720 P.2d at 481 n.3.
Finally, the California court discussed, but rejected, an
exception that would permit a previous landowner's liability to
continue

even

after

the

date

of
12

purchase

until

a

subsequent

landowner

could

property

and

reasonably
take

discover

appropriate

a hazardous defect

precautions

to

in the

remedy

itf

especially if the previous landowner had created the condition.
Id. 720 P.2d at 478 n.2, 480.
The

facts

of

the

instant

exceptions outlined in Preston.

case

fall

under

all

of

the

Furthermoref because of Utah law

regarding latent defects, this Court should not follow Preston
orr

at

least

should

adopt

the

third

exception

rejected

by

Preston.
A.

Commercial Builders Contractors or Renovators
In

excludes

the
from

first

exception,

its

holding

the

any

Preston

effect

court

upon

the

"commercial builders, contractors or renovators."
at 487 n.10.
be

to

specifically
liability

of

Id., 720 P. 2d

It appears that the reason for this exception would

discourage

a

contractor

or

builder

from

substandard

performance when he knows that after his work is completed the
property will be conveyed to a new owner and the contractor or
builder would be insulated from liability.
instead

limits

its

"do-it-yourselfers."
owned

the property

holding
In

other

when the

to

The California court

improvements

words, one

must

made

actually

by
have

improvements were made, made the

improvements himself and then sold it to a third party prior to
the injury in order to be insulated from liability under Preston.
In this case, Lava Hills was the owner of the golf course at
the time it was initially designed and constructed and at the
time

it was

sold

to Southgate.
13

Although

Jackson, LaGant

and

Willie were officers and shareholders^e/f Lava Hills at various
times, they were never, as individuals, owners.

Indeed, LaGant

apparently did not even have an equity interest in Lava Hills at
the time

the

golf

course was

sold

to

Southgate.

Also, both

Jackson and Willie, although they apparently still held stock in
Lava

Hills, no

corporation.

longer

Thus,

had

it

any

supervisory

appears

that

control

only

Lava

over

Hills

that
might

possibly be excepted from liability under the Preston rule.
B.

Owner/Developer
Even

assuming

that

Jackson,

LaGant

and

Willie

were

the

vendors of the golf course at the time it was sold to Southgate,
the

second

exception

under

Preston

applies

because

they

were

owners/developers who, previous to conveying the golf course to
Southgate, had
property.

fully

designed,

constructed

and

developed

the

Under this exception, more emphasis is placed upon the

landowner's role as the creator of the dangerous condition and he
is

found

to

be

liable

despite

his

subsequent

sale

of

the

property.
This Court apparently applied this exception in Loveland v.
Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763 (Utah 1987) .
of a home brought
company

and

the

There, the purchasers

an action against the city, the

developer

of

the

subdivision

for

irrigation
failing

to

design and construct a fence or other barrier over a canal in
which the plaintiffs' child drowned shortly after the plaintiffs
purchased

the

interest, Jacor.

property

from

the

developer's

The lower court granted
14

successor

summary

judgment

in
in

favor of all defendants and this Court affirmed, holding, inter
alia, that the developer had no duty to disclose any dangers in
the canal to Jacor or plaintiffs.

This Court based its decision

upon Section 352 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which was
the primary

basis

for the Preston decision.

This Court then

stated:
The Lovelands contend that they did not sue Brown
Brothers in its capacity as a vendor of lot sixteen,
but rather as the developer of the property.
Brown
Brothers,
without
authority,
claims
that
this
distinction is of no legal consequence. We disagree.
Although^£here has been no wholesale importation of the
princip^a^^underlying products liability into the real
estate context, some exceptions have arisen where the
prior landowner was a professional developer.
Id. at 768 (citing Preston v. Goldman, 42 Cal. 3d 108, 117 n.3,
720 P.2d 476, 481 n.3 (1986)).
Although
subdivision

this case did not

as

in Loveland,

involve

since

the development

Jackson, LaGant

of a

and Willie

developed the property, the same exception outlined in Preston
and Loveland

should apply to them despite Plaintiff's lack of

privity with them.
Before leaving Loveland, this Court should note two other
exceptions
Preston

to

and

the

vendor

discussed

at

non-liability
some

length

rule

touched

in

Loveland.

upon

in

Those

exceptions, set forth in Section 353 of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts are set forth in Loveland as follows:
The first exception involves a vendor!s duty to
disclose to the vendee any concealed conditions known
to the vendor which involve an unreasonable danger.
The second exception is that a vendor owes a duty for a
reasonable time to those outside the land who are
15

injured after the sale by a dangerous condition on the
land.
Loveland,

746

omitted)

P. 2d

(citing

at

768

(emphasis

Restatement

(Second)

in
of

original)
Torts

(footnotes

§§

353,

373

(1965)) .
Regarding the first Loveland exception, there is at least an
issue

of

fact

presented

(although

affidavits

or

admittedly
other

none

sworn

of

the

testimony

parties

have

addressing

this

issue, Plaintiff has raised it as an allegation in her Complaint)
as to whether Jackson, LaGant and/or Willie failed to properly
disclose a concealed defect in the golf course to Southgate at
the time of sale.
C.

Reasonably Extended Liability
The second exception

in Loveland

is similar

to the third

exception that was rejected in Preston; that is, that the vendor
should continue to be liable to third parties who come onto the
land until the vendee has had a reasonable time to discover and
correct

the

dangerous

condition.

This

exception

has

been

supported in Cogliati v. Ecco High Frequency Corp.f 9 2 N.J. 40 2,
456 A.2d 524f 531 (1983).

The New York Supreme Court has carried

this exception a step further by determining that there is always
liability
negligence

to
by

a

prior

owner

creating

Murphy, 83 Misc. 2d

the

who

commits

dangerous

39, 371 N.Y.S.2d

affirmative

condition.
97, 100

acts

of

Merrick

v.

(N.Y. Sup. Ct.

1975) .
In the instant case, there is clearly an issue of fact as to
whether

a reasonable

time

has

passed
16

to

enable

Southgate

to

correct any defect created by Jacksonf

LaGant and/or Willie.

Further, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Jackson, LaGant and/or Willie created the dangerous condition, if
this Court were to adopt the New York rule under Merrick.
As will be explained in Point V, and based upon the lower
Court's ruling to that effect, Southgate is not liable for any
defect or dangerous condition that it neither knew nor should
have known existed at the golf course at the time Southgate took
possession and control of it.

Consequently, unless Plaintiff

were allowed to maintain a cause of action against the persons
who actually created the dangerous condition, in spite of their
vendor status, she would be effectively denied a remedy.
Because the facts of this case fall under one or more of the
exceptions outlined in Preston, which have been or should be
followed by this Court, Plaintiff should be entitled to maintain
her claim against Jackson, LaGant and Willie, despite their
possible status as vendors.

POINT II
BECAUSE JACKSON, WILLIE AND LAGANT HAVE FAILED TO
PROPERLY RAISE THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN THEIR
ANSWERS, SUCH DEFENSE IS WAIVED
Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
the affirmative defense of statute of limitations must be raised
in the responsive pleading, in this case, the answer.
Civ. P. 8(c).

Utah R.

Further, Rule 9(h) states that the defense of

statute of limitation must be raised with some particularity by
17

specifying the particular section, subsection and/or particular
provision relied upon.

Id., 9(h).

It is undisputed that none of the Answers filed by Jacksonf
LaGant or Willie raise the affirmative defense of the statute of
limitations,

much

78-12-25.5—upon

less

which

specifically

the

court

identify

relied

in

its

Section
Summary

Judgment—with any particularity.
Rule 12(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that unless a defense, such as the statute of limitationsf is
raised

by

an

initial motion

or

(answer) such a defense is waived.

in

the

responsive

Id., 12(h).

pleading

This Court has

applied that rule most recently in Staker v. Huntington Cleveland
Irrigation Co.f 664 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1983),.

There, a plaintiff

brought an action to recover reimbursement of excessive water
fees he had paid to the defendant water company.

On the morning

of trial, the defendant sought to amend its answer to claim that
plaintiff's
limitations.

claim

was

barred

by

the

applicable

statute

of

The lower court denied the motion and ultimately

granted judgment for plaintiff.

This Court affirmed the denial

of the motion to amend the answer, stating that

ff

[t]he statute of

limitations defense must be pleaded as an affirmative defense in
the responsive pleading, or it is waived, Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c)
and 12(h), unless an amended pleading asserting the defense is
allowed pursuant to the requirements of Rule 15(a)."

See also

Wasatch Mines Co. v. Hopkinson, 24 Utah 2nd 70, 465 P.2d 1007,
1010-11

(1970).

Cf. ,

Creekview
18

Apartments

v.

State

Farm

Insurance

Co., 771

P.2d

693,

694-95

(Utah

Ct.

App.

1989)

(insurance policy "statute of limitations" is waived because it
was not contained in a responsive pleading)! .
Based upon Rule 12(h) as construed in S taker and others,
Jackson, LaGant and Willie waived the statute of limitations
defense and the lower Court improperly granted Summary Judgment
on the basis of the statute of limitations^

POINT III
SECTION 78-12-25.5 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE
UTAH OPEN COURTS PROVISION
If this Court agrees with the Court below that Jackson,
LaGant and Willie have properly raised the statute of limitations
defense, then this Court should determine whether such statute is
unconstitutional in light of Article I, Section 11 of the Utah
Constitution, the Open Courts Provision.

Indeed, even if this

Court reverses the lower court's decision on the grounds that the
statute
provide

of

limitations

some

defense

guidance

to

was waived,

the

lower

it

court

should
as

to

still
the

constitutionality of the statute if the statute of limitations
defense is ultimately allowed to be raised by amendment.
The statute of limitations

(actually a statute of repose)

upon which Jackson, LaGant and Willie rely, provides that no
person can bring an action for personal injury or property damage
"against

any

person

performing

or

furnishing

the

design,

planning, supervision of construction or construction" of any

19

improvement

to

real

property

that

may

be

defective

or

in a

dangerous condition, if such action is brought more than seven
years

after

the

construction

is completed.

Utah Code Ann. §

78-12-25.5 (Supp. 1989) .
In this case, there may be a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether construction of the golf course was ever completed,
thereby precluding
states

in his

the statute

affidavit

from beginning

that he

designed

the

to run.
golf

Willie

course

to

include trees that would be planted between the 14th and 15th
tees and that construction was never completed.

Willie Affidavit

11 8-9, 12.
Assuming that there is no issue of fact that the golf course
was completed by the time it was open for business, then it is
undisputed
occurred
against

that more

than

seven years have passed

and Plaintiff would be barred
Jackson,

LaGant

and

Willie

since

that

from a cause of action

under

Section

78-12-25.5.

Because under Section 78-12-25.5, Plaintiff is denied a remedy
against Jackson, LaGant and Willie before it even arises, that
provision is unconstitutional under the Open Courts Provision of
the Utah Constitution.
Article I Section 11 of the Utah Constitution declares that
11

[a] 11 courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done

to him and his person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy
by due

course

of

law

. . .

."

Utah

Const,

art. I,

§ 11.

Although this Court has never addressed the constitutionality of
Section 78-12-25.5 under Article I Section 11, it has determined
20

that

a

similar

Liability

Act

statute
is

of

repose

under

unconstitutional

under

the

Utah

the

Products

Open

Courts

Provision.
In Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 111 P.2d 670
(Utah 1985) plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action against
the

manufacturer

of

an

airplane

under

products

liability

theories, for defects in the airplane that caused the death of
their

husband

and

father.

The

lower

court

granted

summary

judgment to the defendant manufacturer of the airplane on the
grounds that the action was barred under Section 78-15-3 of the
Utah Code, which provided that a products liability action cannot
be brought more than six years after the product is initially
purchased or ten years after its date of manufacture.

This Court

reversed the summary judgment and remanded the matter to the
lower

court

for

trial, holding

that

the

products

liability

statute of repose was unconstitutional under the Open Courts
Provision.

The court then established a two-part analysis for

determining whether a provision is unconstitutional under the
Open Courts Provision:
First, section 11 is satisfied if the law provides
an
injured person
an effective
and reasonable
alternative remedy "by due course of law" for
vindication of his constitutional interest.
The
benefit
provided
by
the
substitute
must
be
substantially equal in value or other benefit to the
remedy abrogated in providing essentially comparable
substantiative protection to one's person, property, or
reputation, although the form of the substitute remedy
may be different. . . .
Second, if there is no substitute or alternative
remedy provided, abrogation of the remedy or cause of
21

action may be justified only if there is a clear social
or economic evil to be eliminated and the elimination
of an existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or
unreasonable means for achieving the objective.
Id. at 680 (citations and footnote omitted).
Under the first part of the analysis, it appears that the
substitute remedy contemplated would be something similar to the
worker's compensation and no fault insurance provisions.
677.

In

this

case, the

legislature

has

not

Id. at

developed

any

alternative statutory remedy like worker's compensation or no
fault

insurance

that would

appropriately

compensate

a party

injured by an improvement completed more that seven years prior
to the injury.
Jackson, LaGant and/or Willie may argue that Plaintiff does
have another common law remedy against Southgate, who was the
owner and occupier of the golf course at the time of Plaintiff's
injury.

That remedy, based upon the authorities cited below, is

contingent upon Plaintiff proving that the defect or dangerous
condition in the property was known or should have been known by
Southgate prior to the injury.

Although Plaintiff contends that

whether Southgate knew or should have known of a defect in the
golf course is a question of fact and that the lower Court's
grant of Summary Judgment was improper, there is still some
likelihood that the trier of fact will ultimately determine that
any defect or dangerous condition in the golf course was latent
to Southgate and, therefore, Southgate would not be liable.

If

Section

be

78-12-25.5

is

upheld,

22

then

Plaintiff

would

effectively denied any remedy whatsoever for her injuries, even
against the very parties who created the defect and dangerous
condition.
The second prong of the Berry analysis is whether there is
any justifiable legislative purpose behind the statute of repose.
In Berry, this Court performs an extensive analysis of whether
the products liability statute of repose is justifiable.

That

analysis is likewise applicable to the builders statute of repose
at issue here.

Based upon that analysis, in this case, as in

Berry, this Court should determine that Section 78-12-25.5 "does
not reasonably and substantially advance the stated purpose of
the statute . . . and whatever beneficial effects may accrue from
the statute of repose do not justify the denial of the rights
protected by Article I section 11."
One

justification

Id. at 683.

for the statute of

repose

that may be

offered by Jackson, LaGant and/or Willie, which was not discussed
in Berry, is that the statute prevents a builder or architect
from having to defend "stale" claims for improvements that were
constructed decades previous to the injury.
true, the burden

is even greater

upon

Although that may be

a plaintiff, who must

prosecute an action based upon a claimed defect that occurred so
very long ago.
it would

Indeed, since Plaintiff has the burden of proof,

appear

that a difficulty

in obtaining

witnesses

and

evidence from decades ago would be more detrimental to Plaintiff
than

to

rejected

any
such

of

the

Defendants.

a justification

The

Florida

in striking down
23

Supreme

Court

a builder and

architect statute of repose under its open courts provision in
Overland Construction Co, v. Sirmons, 369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979).
There, the Florida Supreme Court stated as follows:
We recognize the problems which inhere in exposing
builders
and
related
professionals
to
potential
liability for an indefinite period of time after an
improvement to real property has been completed.
Undoubtedly, the passage of time does aggravate the
difficulty of producing reliable evidence, and it is
likely that advances in technology tend to push
industry standards inexorably higher.
The impact of
these problems, however, is felt by all litigants.
Moreover, the difficulties of proof would seem to fall
at least as heavily on injured plaintiffs, who must
generally carry the initial burden of establishing that
the defendant was negligent.
In any event, these
problems are not unique to the construction industry,
and they are not sufficiently compelling to justify the
enactment of legislation which, without providing an
alternative means of redress, totally abolishes an
injured person's cause of action.
Id., at 574.
Finally, by holding Section 78-12-25.5 unconstitutional, as
it did the products liability statute of repose in Berry, this
Court would not be treading new ground, but would be joining a
growing number of jurisdictions that have done likewise.

See,

e.g. , Id. ; Say lor v. Hall, 497 S.W. 2d 218 (Ky. 1973); Daugaard
v. Baltic Cooperative

Building

Supply Ass'n, 349 N.W.

2d 419

(S.D. 1984); Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821 (Wyo.
1980) .
Based upon the above discussion, this Court should determine
that

Section

78-12-25.5

is

an

unjustified

abrogation

Plaintiff's constitutional rights under Article I Section 11.

24

of

POINT IV
SECTION 78-12-25.5 IS A CONSTITUTIONAL DENIAL OF EQUAL
PROTECTION UNDER THE UTAH AND UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS
The

appellants

liability
equal

in

Berry

also

argued

that

the

products

statute of repose was an unconstitutional denial of

protection

Constitution
Constitution.

under

and

the

Article
14th

I

Section

Amendment

24

of

the

of

the

United

Utah
States

Either because it determined that the Open Court's

Provision was more applicable to the facts at hand or because
that provision effectively disposed of the case, this Court did
not address the equal protection argument in Berry.

Despite the

apparent inclination of this Court to at least downplay an eaual
protection challenge in a case like this, Plaintiff will briefly
address that issue here.
Article I section 24 of the Utah Constitution provides that
"[a]11 laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation."
Utah Const, art. I, § 24.

Similarly, the 14th amendment to the

United States Constitution provides that no state shall "deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
law.

U.S. Const,

construed

amend.

the application

Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d
struck

down

as

14, §

1.

This

Court

has

recently

of both of the above provisions
661

(Utah 1984) .

unconstitutional

the

in

There, this Court

Utah

Automobile

Guest

Statute, deciding the case under Article I section 24 of the Utah
Constitution.

Therefore

this

Court

did

not

consider

constitutional arguments under the Utah due process clause and

25

the Open Court1 s Provision.

Id. at 693.

In holding the Guest

Statute unconstitutional under Article I Section 24, this Court
established the following criteria:
Article I f § 24 protects against two types of
discrimination. First a law must apply equally to all
persons
within
a
class.
Second,
the
statutory
classifications and the different treatment given the
classes must be based on differences that have a
reasonable tendency to further the objectives of the
statute. If the relationship of the classification to
the statutory objectives is unreasonable or fanciful,
the discrimination is unreasonable.

When persons
are
similarly
situated,
it is
unconstitutional to single out one person or group of
persons from among a larger class on the basis of a
tenuous justification that has little or no merit.
Id.

at

670-71

(citations

omitted).

Accordf

University Hospital , 107 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 8-11

Condemarin
(Utah May

v.
1,

1989); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d
884 f 889-90 (Utah 1988) .
In this case, it would appear that Section 78-12-25.5 is not
unconstitutional under the first type of discrimination described
in Malan.

All plaintiffs who have brought a cause of

action

prior to seven years before completion are treated the same and
all plaintiffs who have brought a cause of action more than seven
years after completion are treated the same.

In other words, it

is the seven year period from date of completion that determines
the class into which a particular person falls.

Therefore, in

order for Section 78-12-25.5 to pass constitutional muster, there
must be some reasonable justification and legislative objective
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that

is

fulfilled

by

the

classification.

The

analysis

thus

becomes essentially the same as in Berry.
Based upon the analysis in Berry and Malan, the rationale
for upholding Section 78-12-25.5 is not justified.
other

jurisdictions

similar

to Section

equal protection.

have

determined

78-12-25.5

that

Additionally/

statutes

are unconstitutional

of

repose

denials of

See e.g., Shebulia v. Architects Hawaii Ltd.f

65 Hawaii 26, 647 P.2d

276

(1982); Loyal Order of Moose Lodge

1785 v. Cavaness, 563 P.2d 143 (Okla. 1977); Broome v. Truluck,
270 S.C. 227 f

241 S.E. 2d 739

(1978); Kallas Milwark Corp. v.

Square D Co. f 66 Wis. 2d 382, 225 N.W. 2d 454 (1975).

POINT V
THERE IS A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACTf PRECLUDING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AS TO WHETHER SOUTHGATE KNEW OR
SHOULD HAVE KNOWN OF ANY DEFECT IN THE GOLF COURSE
Plaintiff's primary claim of negligence against Southgate is
that, as the owner of the golf course, it failed to properly
inspect the premises
warn

Plaintiff

of

for defects and dangerous conditions, to

such conditions

and

to properly

maintain the course in a reasonably safe condition.

repair

and

It is clear

In Condemarin, two justices in the majority expressed some
dissatisfaction with the equal protection analysis, rather than a
due process analysis, in determining the constitutionality of a
governmental immunity provision. Condemarin, 107 Utah Adv. Rep.
5, at 11 (Durham, J., lead opinion), 20-21 (Zimmerman, J.
concurring in part).
On the other hand, the third justice
concurring in the majority believed the equal protection approach
to be more appropriate.
Id. at 22 (Stewart, J., separate
opinion).
Because of this apparent divergence in the Court,
Plaintiff
has
presented
for
review
analyses
under
both
approaches.
27

that Southgate has such a duty under Utah case law.
Colorado

Fuel

& lrony

24 Utah

2d 214, 469 P.2d

Stevens v.

3, 5

(1970);

Rogalski v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 3 Utah 2d 203, 282 P.2d 304,
307 (1955).
Southgate has

further contended

that

for Plaintiff

to be

able to enforce this duty she must be able to show that Southgate
either created the dangerous condition or that it had actual or
constructive notice of it.

Koer v. Mayfair Markets, 19 Utah 2d

339, 431 P.2d 566, 569 (1967).
In

order

to

affirm

the

Summary

Judgment

in

favor

of

Southgate, this Court must consider the evidence in a light most
favorable

to

Plaintiff

and

still

conclude

that

there

are

no

genuine issues of material fact and that Southgate is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.

Themy v. Seagull Enterprises, Inc.,

595 P.2d 526, 528-29 (Utah 1979).

In other words, as long as any

part of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
admissions or affidavits show that there is any genuine issue of
material fact, summary judgment is not warranted and this Court
should reverse.

Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).

Assuming that the above stated

law regarding the duty of

Southgate is correct, the sworn statements on file with the Court
establish

that

there

are

genuine

issues

of

material

fact

precluding summary judgment as follows:
1.

Did Southgate create a defective or dangerous conditions

that existed on April 5, 1986?
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2.

Did

Southgate

know

or

should

it have

known

of a

defective or dangerous condition that existed on the golf
course?
The first issue of fact will be discussed
below.

in Point VI f

The lower Court determined that there was no genuine

issue of fact as to whether Southgate knew or should have known
of

any

defect

or

dangerous

condition

in

the

golf

course.

However, the affidavits establish that there is an issue of fact
as to whether Southgate had actual or constructive notice.
A.

Actual Notice.
Plaintiff's expert stated in his affidavit that he believed

there was a defect in the design and/or construction of the golf
course, because of the proximity
without

a

natural

or

of the 14th and 15th tees
2
artificial barricade between them.

Further, Mr. Rainville stated that such defect existed on the
date of the accident, April 5, 1986.

Therefore, a reasonable

inference would be that the defect could have been caused by the
modifications made to the 14th hole by Southgate itself, after
its purchase from Lava Hills but before the accident. Therefore,
if Southgate created all or a portion of the defect, it must have
had actual notice of it.

Obviously, according to Mr. Rainville, it would have been
unnecessary for an artificial or natural barrier if hole 15 had
been shortened to obviate the danger caused by the proximity of
the tee boxes.
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B.

Constructive Notice,
Considering the Affidavit of Mr. Rainville in a light most

favorable to Plaintiff, this Court must assume that there was a
defect

in the

golf

course

as of April

5,

1986.

In their

affidavits, both Richard Schmutz and William Atkin state that
fl

[t]he

layout of

the course

as

it existed

at

the

time of

Plaintiff's accident was patent and easily observable by any
person playing the course.

Additionally, a person preparing to

tee off on the 15th hole would have previously played the 14th
hole and would be familiar with the proximity and location of the
two tees."

Schmutz Affidavit M

8-9; Atkin Affidavit M

7-8.

If

the layout and condition of the course was so observable to
Plaintiff, then

it should have been even more observable to

Southgate, who owned and operated the course on a daily basis.
Therefore, Plaintiff has raised a genuine issue as to whether
Southgate should have known of a defect in the course that they
had been operating and even modifying during the past 11 months.
Finally, the lower Court had already determined that any
defect, assuming one existed, "could have been discovered by
Defendant Southgate through such an inspection as would be made
in the exercise of ordinary care and prudence."

Findings 1 10.

Hence, it would appear that the lower court's own rulings as to
constructive notice are inconsistent.

If the lower court is not

even sure in which direction to go, it would appear that there is
at least a genuine issue of material fact.
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POINT VI
THERE IS A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO WHETHER
SOUTHGATE CREATED A DEFECT OR DANGEROUS CONDITION
ON THE GOLF COURSE, WHICH CAUSED PLAINTIFF'S INJURY
Even assuming

the

lower court was correct

in determining

that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Southgate knew or should have known of any defect in the golf
course, that court should have not granted judgment as a matter
of law because there was still an issue as to whether Southgate
created a defective or dangerous condition.
As

stated

above, Mr. Rainville

has

stated

that, in his

opinion, there was a defect in the golf course as of April 5,
1986.

April 5, 1986 was after Southgate had performed various

modifications

to

modifications,

the

modifications

of

the
golf
the

14th

hole.

course
14th

was

hole,

Yet,
still

even

after

defective.

Southgate

thus

those
By

at

its

least

contributed to creating the unsafe condition of the golf course
on

April

5,

1986.

Whether

Southgatefs

contribution

to

the

condition of the golf course gives rise to its liability is,
therefore, a genuine issue of material fact.

CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the lower Court as to the Summary
Judgments of all Defendants and remand the case for trial before
the trier of facts.

If this Court is inclined to reverse the

Summary Judgment in favor of Jackson, LaGant and Willie on the
grounds that they have waived the statute of limitations defense,
31

such reversal should be with directions to the lower Court that
Section 78-12-25.5

is unconstitutional

under

the Open Courts

and/or Equal Protection Provisions of the Utah and United States
Constitutions.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J^O^

day of July, 1989.

CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE

&%#£ fa &^—

FLOYDGW HOLM

Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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>V/S* dav cf July, ;°8?,

•'orropi-i' RP-TT.'TT rr APPELLANT
)Ostaap

prepaid.
Richard K. Glauser, Esq.
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
Southgate Golf Course
4 Triad Center, '/inte 500
P.O. Box 2970
Salt Lake C ity, • 'l . \ i m n • n»' n
Paul Graf, Esq.
Attorney for Defendan 1 /Appe] 1 e e
John Willie
P.O. Box 16 37
St. George
** -<
'()
Terry L. Wade, Esq.
SNOW"', NUFFER, ENGSTROM & DRAKE
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
Rex Jackson
90 East 200 North
P.O. Box 40 0
St. George, Utah 8 4 770
Timothy B. Anderson, Esq.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
John LaGant
249 East Tabernacle, Suite 200
St. George, Utah 8 4770

FLOYtf'jW HOLM

ADDENDUM
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FLOYD W HOLM [Ioz2]
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
250 South Main Street
P.O. Box 7 26
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone:
(801) 586-4 404

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT ^OURT IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CORY KLATT,
9

Plaintitf,

SECOND AMENDED
COMPLAINT

10
"i i

12 ||
:i ? •

vs

IKE THOMAS; JOHN DOE 1, d/b/a
SOUTHGATE GOLF COURSE; LAVA
HILLS RESORT CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation; REX JACKSON;
JOHN LaGANT; and JOHN WILLIE,
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Plaintiff, for cause of action against Defendants, alleges
as follows:

18 "|
1'J

1.

22

2.

Course
place

24

° '

-

unknov
: ! i ' - : •;

>iRiriiiuitei

"Sou tliqat e" *

1 usinfts. 1

--V-K:^^

•ubsurtute

is

'-'i.thgate

^^mi

* '**

* Lc * r*;e nan*

t

as

J

MAIN

.

726

BOX

f u!..:«u.-i'

has
M

ursuan n .

. l,ia.::txff

U^,I;:

*~r, p r i n c i p a l
v

reserves

- '"
the

Ichr. Dot1 * :* :-ucti t i m e

ach t r u e name becomes known t o h e r

CITY.

H 84720
586-4404

an

i --:^T;.

AT L A W

OUTH
•AR

'*t

'.omas")

I: >- .1 <. ;ie County, Idaho.

.'Qu:e,
;i.'

IEYS

Defendai

.--.-*

partn*;! -

2c

4BERLA1N

r< * - •

TCaVjLa^v.. !<_.:,;:<;.:M

2
21

i \

Defendants,

15;

1"

i

At

as

'S

1

3.

At

ail

times

pertinent

Lava

Hills

2

Resort Corporation

3

organized and existing under the laws of the State of Utah, with

4

its principal place of business in Washington County, Utah.

5

4.

Upon

6

John

7

individuals")

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

LaGant

(hereinafter

information
and
are

John

and

individuals

5.

(hereinafter

residing

in

Rex Jackson,
"Lava

Washington

Hills
County,

The accident that is the subject of this accident took

place in Washington County, Utah.
6.

Plaintiff, at all times pertinent herein, was a business

invitee of Southgate.
7.

At

all

individuals were

times

pertinent

officers, employees

herein,

the

Lava

Hills

or agents of Lava Hills,

acting within the course and scope of such employment or agency.
8.

On or about April 5, 19 86 at approximately 12:15 p.m.,

Plaintiff was standing on the tee-box of the 15th hole of the
golf course owned and operated by Southgate in St. George, Utah.
9.

At the same time and place, Thomas was on the tee-box

of, upon information and belief, the 14th hole of the same golf

22

Plaintiff.

23

modification of the golf course.

25

belief, Defendants

Utah.

course,

24

"Lava Hills") was a corporation

Willie

21

rfBERLAIN
HIGBEE

herein, Defendant

10.

which

was

approximately

50

to

75

yards

southwest

of

The 14th hole was a temporary hole being used during

Immediately thereafter, and while Plaintiff was still

standing on the 15th tee, Plaintiff hit a golf ball from the 14th
tee in a northerly direction, the ball sliced to the right and,

SOUTH MAIN
. BOX 726
)AR CITY,

M 84720
586-4404

AZ.

without

warning

c a u s i nc '

*

from

Thomas,

struck

Plaintiff

< >n

! In

;,ioo,

_..•,..
^s

.-.

lesuit

irnurien

:

face,

* lie-

.incident,

~ncludiiiy,

".\lainti::

ustained

our

:.oro: •.
he
1

he f o l l o w i n g

accident
acts

oi

and

noqiirjf'n'"'

i: . ui -

•»

hitting

<ibr( : : . i : : : ::n +-hat
'o

thers,

injuric-f

.t

. :aintiif

b . :;

i.

<:olt

••

t a 1.:

•

K:

^uwl«: be d o n e s a f e l y

;ncluding P l a i n t i - : ;

tak*

m

• *ic(. r

proper

\;^\,:^\

\

; irs*

injury

* be

go3f

«o that Plaintiff

ball
could

appropriate precautions lor nei L^ 4 <»-

a_; t ; ^l .

i , u:

T

: \'<omas were a proximate cause of

; < :

'IT*- accident

tnc
^encc *i4) t ; :t_ pari

la;
hol<jr N'<*

-.ilowjnq

. : :• patrons

ol ^'uuihcate:
**

• ^^i]*' moditicatic: •

(

prpc^

incii:dr>: Plaintiff, ot

«-

*

the

t emporary

..s;
;enct--,

appropriate barrier : or -h<- safotv oi

the

>:

ind

I icuntiii *r, direciior

: -*

I

from

anc w i t h o u t

- _: :
travelling

resulted

•"• '

'.-••«>;

• •

•

screen

or

cthei

its lusiness invitees.
i'*l 1 airway

l!'".U), lee;

A3

ana

1

(c)

Failure to warn

its business

invitees, including

2

Plaintiff

3

proximity of the tees for the 14th and 15th holes; and

4

(d)

and

Thomas,

of

the

danger

posed

by

the

close

Failure to take other appropriate precautions

for

5

the safety of its business invitees, including Plaintiff.

6

15.

7
8
9

The negligent acts of Southgate were a proximate cause

of Plaintiff's injuries.
16.

The accident and injuries to Plaintiff resulted from

the following acts of negligence on the part of the Lava Hills

10

individuals

11

individuals:

12
13

and

(a)

Lava

Hills

Failure

to

by

and

safely

through

design

the

the

Lava

golf

course

(b)

15

to

16

Plaintiff.

Failure to safely construct the golf course so as

prevent

17

(c)

injury

Failure

to

to

general

public,

Southgate

and/or

the

inform

including

its

18

successors

19

have

20

injury to the general public, including Plaintiff.

21

17.

23

to

prevent injury to the general public, including Plaintiff.

14

22

Hills

in

known

interst of

existed

on

latent

the

golf

defects

other

it knew or

course, which

should

could

cause

The negligent acts of the Lava Hills individuals and

Lava Hills were a proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries.
18.

As

a

proximate

result

of

the

negligence

of

all

24

Defendants, Plaintiff has incurred hospital and medical expenses

25

in an

ERLAIN

amount

in

excess

of Eight

Hundred

Eighty

Five

Dollars

($885.00) and sustained physical pain and mental anguish.
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tOX

726

CITY,

BA7ZO
86-4404

A4

"1 f-.

• i3 anticipated

' '— :

that Plaintiff wil'1 sust^ir
• . • i -

<- *

:;OL : or

the

rhvsical

remainder

ot

her

• •

life.

By

u:uref

reason

•

the

negligence of Defendants, Plaint:' r l:as been damaged generally
'} lousand D< • _;r.
Laintiff

has

• :

incurred, medical

and will continue to do so uu- •:
in

an

amount

to

be

,0 00 . 00)

proven

and

hospital, expenses

:•<*; ih^'

at

time

L.JIO

.* -

of

trial

•i

-.the:

appropriate hearing.
&s
Defendants,
customary

a

j: • i o : i: :i n: i a t e

Diaiiitit:
emplovmenl

i: e s i l ] t

:.as t e e n

of

-ir-ible

.mo. v. . ] ' * .

11 i e

to

- nal-1'

- • -; i i q«-

'.; : \
* •'

*cnt ;:"•>

"

;<

•*

• >•

; lie .

di.iT.i

-

' ' ^ v : + i 4 i \. •*

••

- .: •:._.

.in.at:c;

: :icon<

aid w i l l

corit i ::'>•• to d o s o

in a n a m o u n t

at t h e t i m e < \ t: : - *. oi cither a p p r o p r i a t e
-irsuor *

'-

be proven

hearing.
"* .

* - <

pecial damages incuri«o ] v :ier at the ]\ite of eiqht percent
•"r

i nrv."

* : O T arid after the dat » •

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff

prays

: <n

jointly and r>evo

:

5

* he accident unt U

(8V

1W

<ia1«i

judgment agai nst Defendants,

1

1.

For special damages, including medical expenses and lost

2j

income, together with interest thereon as may be determined by

3 i

the Court at the time of trial;

4j

2.

For future special damages, including medical expenses

5

and lost income, the exact amount of which is unknown at this

6

time, but for which may be determined by the Court at the time of

7

trial;

8

3.

For general damages in the sum of $50,000.00;

9

4.

For costs of this action; and

10

5.

For such other and

11
12

further

relxef as the Court deems

just and proper.
DATED this

o?/-~-day of

13

C/07V0*+-

, 1988.

CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE

14
15

^)XT4^~-

16

FLOYD W£pOLM
Attorneys for Plaintiff

17

Plaintiff's Address:

18

1885 Pelican Lane
West Yellowstone, Montana

19
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I

HEREBY

CERTIFY

that

I hand

delivered

a full, true and

correct copy oi ' }\<- loroaoino SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT to each of
the follow m i
/xb-

•

nn ' , | i i.it.;H]<! l v! I ly prepaid on thi

day !•: October, i9oh:
Richard i.. Ciauc^i
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH
Attorneys for Defendant Southgate
Golf Course
4 Triad Center, Suite 0 0
P.O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970
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1
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15
16
17
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21
22

Paul Graf r Esq.
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St. George, Utah R
Terry L. Wade, Esq.
SNOWf NUFFER, ENGSTROM & DRAKE
Attorney for Defendant Rex Jackson
9 0 East 200 North
P.O. Box 400
St.
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Ut.ili

J HI ' 0

Timothy B. Anderson
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOl
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FIFTH DiSTRICT COUw.W A £ H - - - : ; • : ; COUNTY

' 8 7 OCT 2 8 Fin 9 SM
CLERK

WENDELL E. BENNETT
Bar License #0287
Attorney at Law
Attorney for Defendant Thomas
448 East 400 South, Suite 304
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
801-532-7846
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
AFFIDAVIT OF VERN THOMAS,
aka IKE THOMAS

CORY KLATT,
Plaintiff.
vs
IKE THOMAS and JOHN DOE I,
dba SOUTHGATE GOLF COURSE,

Civil No. 86-1116

Defendants.
oooOooo
VERN THOMAS, ALSO KNOWN AS IKE THOMAS, being first duly
sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

That he is one of the defendants above named.

2.

That he makes this affidavit of his own knowledge.

3.

That on the 5th day of April, 1986, he was playing golf

at the Southgate Golf Course in St. George, Utah.

In conjunction

with that game of golf, he hit a tee shot from the 14th tee box,
intending the ball to go toward the 14th green.
4.

That the tee shot from the 14th tee box did not go dir-

ectly toward the green, but sliced, which is something that occasionally occurs to right handed golfers, and immediately after I

AL

hit the shot, one of the members of my golfing party, namely, Bob
Johnson, i nxmediateh7 hollered "fore" at the earliest moment it
:.

. •-

•

. .:

.:•* i.ji: was slicing to the r:;ii;; .

dso -jaw the bal. J at abo\ . rhe same time ! heart: "\ .
. ; ohnson h-^! I vr " ?oro" . it Lak11ly
LL'ie
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the

b a 11

.)i
was

* ;^>

. .1 *. ,

s i i c i nr,
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to

T

r iii1

• c: t: j € r i * :)d

^

completed
hr

my

swing,

' *'Wa ? 11

'

.^nd

r ^ a i : .. j_ii>i

* -e

.-ox.

a

hazaru

so

- ^ ! 1f. -*r e d

:.aii
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approachiue

coihn

taen

; issibiy

pose

• •)

them.
6 .

'

. * - • . * . : • •

standing

•••

;:<•

** *:

(direction
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quick!v
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v,;<-

<>:

* hr

r r ivr?w
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n

>ssLbi<=
when

in v o m

t->

:wever .

rrv

• i»i». e

• >e s h o t

u;
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a

-

* noses

i-i

that

"fore"
..

danger

'All * '
U JLU

iron,

•

.,.10^,

HUL

an^

.

v;i ] ]

traveled
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th-

}

adiacent

tn

f-lu-

.-«

FURTHER
nATFh

lULeiH

T wqs

sometime?
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G I I <_ .

* ,:< u r .
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*he

^ 1Iceo
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the
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and
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JLi

AFFIANT

f 11 i

1

'

j

u - n w a v .-.IM

SAITl I NOT,
iJ/lV

0

d U>^M<^

/J-^
VERN

>t.

THOMAS

, 19 8 7 •

/VdW*

-3STATE OF IDAHO

)

COUNTY OF BLAINE

)

VERN THOMAS, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and
says that he is the defendant above named, that he has made and
read the foregoing affidavit and knows the contents thereof; that
the same is true of his own knowledge, except as to matters therein
stated upon information and belief, and as to such matters,
j

believes them to be true.

I

>W.
VERN THOMAS
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o b e f o r e me t h i s
1987.

My C o m m i s s i o n / E x p i r e s

/^

/ JI,(9-y^^d^CL

/-

day of

(p^T^-*'-^

,

.Ftri DioiRICTCOUR
.V!."*: OOUNr
r.{

Timothy B. Anderson of
JONES, .WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDON*
Attorneys for Defendant Lagant
249 East Tabernacle, Suite 200
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (801) 628-1627,

DEPUTY

EN" THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT-COURT FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF; UTAH
.—-oooOooo—CORY ,t«.I.A"i"i l(

Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF
TOHN LAGANT

vs»
I K E

T H Q M A S

A N D

J 0 H N

D 0 E

ui

j^

j

v

i1

No .

'" h" ' ' '•

DBA SOUTHGATE GOLF COURSE,
Defendant.
ooo 0ooo
Ci/<i'r/"«

STATE OF

County of

>u
:er
Defendant

m e a b u v e ^aj

r e s i dent o t

^SlJt/U'DAtJ , Ooyr>^/^C

MVS:

~ act:,

3.
M

Corporate,

nqjiMij', i;^v*iloped the

^J KX

L.

1J>

C"

(now " S o u t h g a t r "

Corporate:

:; I terminated my atfilidti ..i . *. ^i. I respect.. **'

golf course

** • • -s*

5.

* ..*

^a^i'^.

"*

Southgate

,!

. .r*,o's Answers to Interrogatories in: Requests i ui

Production ui bocuments dated September

.•, 1'J87.

Ine Answer

—

/i//

Interrogatory No* 4 sets for the modifications to the golf course
with respect to the 14th and 15th holes where the alleged injury
to plaintiff occurred.
6.

The modification involved the movement of the 14th green

in October, 1985, and the abandonment of the original 15th green
in February, 1986, with attendant construction activity in the area
until October, 1986,
7.

I neither

authorized

nor had

any

knowledge

of or

involvement whatsoever in the modification, design or construction
work referred to in Plaintiff's complaint, and more specifically,
described in the Answer to Interrogatory No. 4 referred to above.
DATED this L? day of.dra^watesr, 1988.
J M N V. LAGANT
.

/

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 6?

//•

day of November,

1988

•L„l-

cAoct

Notary Public
R e s i d i n g i n : JTAIC/^O , C/9
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PAUL F. GRAF #1229
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT JOHN WILLIE
P.O. BOX 1637
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 84765
(801) 628-2757
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH
CORY KLATT,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF
JOHN WILLIE
vs.

IKE THOMAS; John Doe I dba
Southgate Golf Course; Lava
Hills Resort Corporation,
a Utah Corporation; Rex Jackson;
John LaGant; and John Willie,
Civil No. 86-1116

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

)

) ss
)

John Willie, being duly sworn upon his oath deposes and
says :
1.

That I am a defendant in the above-entitled action.

2.

That I have personal knowledge of the facts set

forth herein and am competent to testify.
3.

That I was an officer and shareholder in Lava Hills

Resort Corporation at the time of its incorporation in
December of 1975.
4.

That on July 1, 1976, I resigned as an officer of

the Lava Hills Resort Corporation, but remained as a small
stockholder in Lava Hills Resort Corporation.
5.

That as my contribution to the corporation, in order

to

',uai.: ; v

Golf

Course
6 .

any

ti l e

with

i :i • 11

t h e a i d o f .Join: L a G a n t ,

goil p r o .

. > ...: \

: ' • p r e r a r J ;i ,a t h o o o I f r i: r : e d o s i ^ n ,

That

time

artc-j

7 ,

.iat

a i1 y

a s 11;11 t• inj : .i •i

'J e c o m e

worI:

a * n- c a p a c r , . • i
' ^as

never

ia

• never

>. a - p *. - n c o n t

p a i u ,; f L \ \i o a * • \

'l i

. .idi.

north

end

at

'*ontractor,

a MI i

hills

••:.:!

8 .

:: • i i s

foi

e .,

< c « J Hi in e IHI e a
L _ "_he g o l f

t.iiMscapiuK

_ourse,

..long

i n c l u o 1n0

,i I 1 : a J I wa ys

'h^

.*!• a:;.]

on

* *,

1io 1es .
9.
war-

r

^ *

That

as

of

'"inlete,

hat
manae^":ea:

July

1

i°76,

specificali}

:. u , i s

i. o t

r the course

^ ^

-he

Lava

^.^^

! , • >1 . e .j *
at L u e L

— «

Hills

Golf

^v.,. » o l e s

oust r u c t i o n
;

Course
were

or

a •- r
., e s o r t

Corporation

dar in * • . i r v

"f-M t r n c t J i

; ;a c e

a iter
Ii

l:u J O S

:nt
1

i < i >. • i : J i i i ., g \ > J I > , u a r b e .
.i nd sr a p l n v u a s

**

1 mi

. . «M

* :..
he

n
aa f

operations

<* f

• ics

as

I i c-i c i.imenu ed

Rex

J a r k s o r.

a

, : « i < J J1 t

: he

-.oil

i

" ,iu

L

-V

- <»in :- i* r< <• <I

-signed.
!

>i t i 1 i t •

C b i *U i :M

b L i i t

• s s 'i s t fi na e

*

V

MM

I d i ng

I i i

i *i a e s i g a

.i

Iae

/f/6"

FURTHER AFFIANT SAITH NAUGHT
DATED th:
lis MJk

day

of August, 1988

^

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

/2^<^xx^T

^

day of

, 1988.

My Commission Expires:

^6l^^K/^' *
Notary Pjiblic
Residing

Certificate of Mail:

at:ftj^g£y<^
t a l Y t f M. SUTTERF1ELD •;
'^^JhfW
E.6fob. St. Geov UT 84770
"9 my comm. expires. 5-24-1992
^x*''

I hereby certify that on the J-j
day of August, 1988,
I mailed a copy of the foregoing Affidavit of John Willie to
to each of the following by -cre~posin
copy, in juh-o-^r-S
~i+a4-l-T—p-rr^rH^ gp pre-paid, nridrrs n W — t t r :
'4/s

ic.

^

^

Floyd W. Holm, Esq.
Chamberlain & Higbee
250 South Main Street
P.O. Box 726
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Richard K. Glauser, Esq.
Hanson, Dunn, Epperson & Smith
650 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Terry L. Wade
Kory D. Staheli
Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake
90 East 200 North
St. George, Utah 84770
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PAUL F. GRAF #1229
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT JOHN WILLIE
P.O. BOX 1637
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 84765
(801) 628-2757
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH
CORY KLATT,
Plaintiff,
vs.

CO-DEFENDANT JOHN WILLIE'S
RESPONSE TO CO-DEFENDANT
SOUTHGATE GOLF COURSE'S
REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS

IKE THOMAS; John Doe I dba
Southgate Golf Course; Lava
Hills Resort Corporation,
a Utah Corporation; Rex Jackson;
John LaGant; and John Willie,
Defendants.

Civxl No. 86-1116

COMES NOW Co-defendant John Willie by and through Paul
F. Graf, his attorney of record in the above captioned matter
and responds to Co-defendant Southgate Golf Course's requests
for admissions as follows:
ADMISSION REQUEST NO. 1: Admit thac you designed the
Lava Hills Golf Course.
RESPONSE TO ADMISSION REQUEST NO. 1: John Willie admits
that he designed the Lava Hills Golf Course with the
assistance of John LaGant.
ADMISSION REQUEST NO. 2: Admit that at the time you
designed the Lava Hills Golf Course, you were acting as an
independent contractor.
RESPONSE TO ADMISSION REQUEST NO. 2: John Willie denies
that he ever worked as an independent contractor in relation

Sj

to his activities with Lava Hills Golf Course.
ADMISSION REQUEST NO. 3: Admit that the' Lava Hills Golf
Course was built by Rex>Jackson«
RESPONSE TO ADMISSION REQUEST NO. 3: John Willie
believes that Rex Jackson built the Lava Hills Golf Course.
John Willie does admit that Rex Jackson had the
responsibility to see that the golf course was built.
ADMISSION REQUEST NO. 4: Admit that Rex Jackson built
the Lava Hills Golf Course according to your designs.
RESPONSE TO ADMISSION REQUEST NO. 4: John Willie denies
that the Lava Hills Golf Course was built according to all
his designs and recommendations. His plan may have been used
as a guide, but his specific recommendations for holes 14 and
15 were not followed in every aspect.
ADMISSION REQUEST NO. 5: Admit that the Lava Hills Golf
Course remained unchanged and unmodified until it was sold
and the name changed to the Southgate Golf Course.
RESPONSE TO ADMISSION REQUEST NO. 5: John Willie has no
basis to admit or deny this request.

He disassociated

himself with the golf course on July 1, 1976, prior to the
completion of the course, more particularly, prior to the
completion of holes 14 and 15.

He does not know the

condition of the golf course when it was initially completed
or the condition at the time of sale.
ADMISSION REQUEST NO. 6: Admit that the Lava Hills Golf
Course as originally designed was not defective.
RESPONSE TO ADMISSION REQUEST NO. 6: John Willie admits

that the Lava Hills Golf Course as originally designed was
not defective,
ADMISSION REQUEST NO, 7: Admit that the Lava Hills Golf
Course as originally built was not defective,
RESPONSE TO ADMISSION REQUEST NO, 7: John Willie has no
knowledge of the conditions of the originally completed golf
course, but admits that if his plans and recommedations were
followed, then the Lava Hills Golf Course as originally

built

was not defective,
ADMISSION REQUEST NO. 8: Admit that the modifications to
the 14th green" made by the Southgafe Golf Course

increased

the angle of play on the 14th hole away from the 15th tee
area.
RESPONSE TO ADMISSION REQUEST NO, 8: John Willie has no
knowledge of the initially completed 14th hole and 15th tee
or modifications later made.
ADMISSION REQUEST NO, 9: Admit that the modification
referred to above, made the course safer than when originally
constructed .
RESPONSE TO ADMISSION REQUEST NO. 9: John Willie has no
knowledge of the modifications made to the 14th hole and 15th
tee .
DATED this 22nd day of S

Fir";.: • -M- i07 COURT
V.;'.Gr.- •'•'

TERRY L WADE-A 3882
SNOW, NUFFER, ENGSTROM & DRAKE
A Professional Corporation
90 East 200 North
P.O. Box 400
St. George, Utah 84770
801/628-1611
File #532501/KDSmisc
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CORY KLATT,

)

Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF REX

)

vs.

JACKSON

)

IKE THOMAS; JOHN DOE I dba
)
SOUTHGATE GOLF COURSE; LAVA
HILLS RESORT CORPORATION,
)
a Utah Corporation; REX JACKSON;
JOHN LaGANT; and JOHN WILLIE,
)
Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

Civil No. 86-1116

)

)
)ss.
)

Rex Jackson, being duly sworn upon his oath deposes and says:
\. That \ am a defendant in the above action.
2. That I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein and am
competent to testify.
3. That I was an officer and shareholder in Lava Hills Resort Corporation from
the time it was incorporated in December of 1975, until May of 1985 when I sold my
shares to Southgate Goti Course.
4. That I had nothing to do with creating a design for the Lava Hills Golf
Course.

1

5. That the golf course was designed by John Willie.
6. That John Willie designed the Golf Course in the capacity of an independent
contractor.
7. That John Willie had complete control over designing the Lava Hills Golf
Course.
8. That I have exercised no control whatsoever over the golf course from the
date I sold my shares in the corporation to Southgate, and specifically, that I had no
control over the course in April of 1986.
9. That after Southgate purchased the golf course, it changed the location of
the 14th green/hole, as well as the direction of the 14th tee box.
10. That in April of 1986, the 14th green/hole was in a different location than it
was in when the golf course was owned by Lava Hills, and furthermore, the direction
or angle of the 14th tee box was materially different as of the said date than it had
been during the ownership of Lava Hills.
11. That during the approximately 10 years the golf course was owned and
operated by Lava Hills, there were no major accidents on the golf course, and
specifically none involving the 14th and 15th holes.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAITH NAUGHT.
DATED this

/ $-

day of

<^*y

, 1988.

EX JACKSON^
REX
JACKSOr
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this / £ ^ ~ day of
J

My Commission Expir

1988.

llUkj

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 12th day of August, 1988, I served a copy
of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF REX JACKSON on each of the following by
depositing a copy in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to:
Floyd W. Holm, Esq.
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE
250 South Main Street
P.O. Box 726
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Richard K. Glauser, Esq.

HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH
650 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Secretary
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!H DISTRICT COURT
WASHINGTON COUNTY

'87 OCT 6 PH 1 2S
CLERK

LOWELL V. SMITH, #3006
RICHARD K. GLAUSER, #4324
HANSON, DONN, EPPERSON & SMITH
A Professional Corporation
Attorney for: Defendant
650 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 363-7611

DEPUTY2^________:

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
CORY KLATT,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD SCHMUTZ
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

VS.

IKE THOMAS and JOHN DOE I,
dba SOUTHGATE GOLF COURSE,
Civil No. 86-1116
Defendants.
Richard Schmutz, being first duly sworn upon oath,
deposes and says:
1.

At the time of the incident underlying plaintiff's

Complaint, affiant was a part-owner of the defendant, Southgate
Golf Course.
2.

The affiant has not only owned a golf course but

also golfs regularly and is familiar with typical golf course
rules, etiquette and procedure.
DESIGN OF GOLF COURSE
3.

The defendant, Southgate Golf Course, purchased the

grounds in May of 1985. The defendant did not design, construct

/IZ5

or in any way create the golf course.

Affiant is informed and

believes that the golf course was created in or near the
mid-1970s and was designed and constructed by the prior owners,
Rex Jackson, John LaGant and John Willie, as agents of the prior
owner, Lava Hills Resort Corporation.

The course was designed

and constructed long before any affiliation with the course
existed with defendant, Southgate Golf Course.
MODIFICATIONS TO THE COURSE
4.

From the time the defendant purchased the golf

course until the accident described in plaintiff's Complaint,
only one modification was made to the golf course.

This

modification was to move the 14th green approximately 130 feet to
the northwest.

This modification was made approximately during

the first two weeks of October, 1985.

The effect of this change

was to make the 15th tee, where plaintiff was allegedly standing
at the time of the accident, further away from the line of fire
of patrons on the 14th hole.

The reason for the damage was not

concern that previous alignment was too close to the 15th tee (it
had played that way 7 years without incident).
sale of land that took the original 14th green.

The reason was
The new green

was closer to the tee and made a shorter #14 3-par hole, and it
was further out of the line of fire from the 15th tee.
NO DEFECT
5.

Since affiant became affiliated with the Southgate

Golf Course, thousands of patrons played the course as it

-2-

appeared at the time of plaintiff's accident.

Thousands of

patrons also played the course as it existed prior to the
modification described above which lessens any danger to patrons
on the 15th tee area.

Of all the players that played the course,

affiant is not aware of any other complaints regarding players on
the 15th tee being struck or threatened by balls hit by patrons
from the 14th tee area.
6.

Affiant believes that the course as it existed at

the time of plaintiff's accident did not create an unreasonable
risk to patrons besides the risk inherent in the game of golf.
7.

The 15th tee is not in the line of fire of patrons

playing the 14th hole.

At the time of plaintiff's accident, the

15th tee center was approximately 253 feet to the northeast of
the 14th tee.

The 15th tee was approximately 160 feet to the

right of the line of fire of the 14th tee.

The 15th tee was

approximately 40 degrees to the right of the line of fire from
the 14th tee to the 14th green.
ASSUMPTION OF RISK
8.

The layout of the course as it existed at the time

of plaintiff's accident was patent and easily observable by any
person playing the course.
9.

Additionally, a person preparing to tee off on the

15th hole would have previously played the 14th hole and would be
familiar with the proximity and location of the two tees.

-3-

10.

The game of golf inherently contains the risk that

golf balls will not travel precisely in the intended course.
Players are aware of these risks and should be alert to the
potential of straying golf balls.

Additionally, golfers are

required to give adequate warnings to other endangered players by
reasonably shouting "fore" when a shot may endanger another
player.
DATED this

/fr & day of September, 1987.

RICHARD SCHMUTZ
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF
RICHARD SCHMUTZ, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes
and says that he is a representative of the defendant above
named? that he has read the foregoing Affidavit and knows the
contents thereof? that the same are true of his own knowledge,
except as to matters therein stated upon information and belief,
and as to such matters, believes them to be true.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me
this jfv P day of September, 1987.

Notary Public
Residing at: U ~~ 1 - *"! 1

-4-

LOWELL V- SMITH, #3006
RICHARD K. GLAOSER, #4324
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH
A P r o f e s s i o n a l Corporation
Attorney for:
Defendant
650 C l a r k Learning O f f i c e C e n t e r
175 S o u t h West Temple
S a l t L a k e C i t y , Utah
84101
Telephone:
(801) 3 6 3 - 7 6 1 1
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT CODRT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

CORY KLATT,
Plaintiff,

1
1
)
)

AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM ATKIN
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
IKE THOMAS and JOHN DOE I,
dba SOUTHGATE GOLF COURSE,

1
]
Civil No. 86-1116

Defendants. 1
William Atkin, being first duly sworn upon oath/
deposes and says:
1.

The affiant is currently the superintendant for the

defendant/ Southgate Golf Course*

Prior to May of 1985, he

worked as the course superintendant for the prior owner, The Lava
Hills Resort Corporation.

Prior to May of 1985, the grounds were

referred to as The Lava Hills Golf Course.

He has been employed

and has worked on that course since October of 1981.

DESIGN OF GOLF COURSE
2.

The defendantf Southgate Golf Course, purchased the

grounds in May of 1985.

The defendant did not designf construct

or in any way create the golf course.

Affiant is informed and

believes that the golf course was created in or near the
mid-1970s and was designed and constructed by the prior ownersf
Rex Jackson, John LaGant and John Willie, as agents of the prior
owner, Lava Hills Resort Corporation.

The course was designed

and constructed long before any affiliation with the course
existed with defendant, Southgate Golf Course.
MODIFICATIONS TO THE COURSE
3.

From the time the defendant purchased the golf

course until the accident described in plaintiff's Complaint,
only one modification was made to the golf course.

This

modification was to move the 14th green approximately 130 feet to
the southwest.

This modification was made approximately during

the first two weeks of October, 1985.

The effect of this change

was to make the 15th tee, where plaintiff was allegedly standing
at the time of the accident, further away from the line of fire
of patrons on the 14th hole.

In essence, this change made it

less likely that patrons on the 15th tee would be in or near the
line of fire from players on the 14th hole.
NO DEFECT
4.

Since affiant became affiliated with the Southgate

Golf Course, thousands of patrons played the course as it

//ZV

appeared at the time of plaintiff's accident.

Thousands of

patrons also played the course as it existed prior to the
modification described above which lessens any danger to patrons
on the 15th tee area*

Of all the players that played the coursef

affiant is not aware of any other complaints regarding players on
the 15th tee being struck or threatened by balls hit by patrons
from the 14th tee area. As the course superintendant for almost
six years, affiant would generally be apprised of any danger to
patrons while playing the course.
5.

Affiant believes that the course as it existed at

the time of plaintiff's accident did not create an unreasonable
risk to patrons besides the risk inherent in the game of golf.
6.

The 15th tee is not in the line of fire of patrons

playing the 14th hole. At the time of plaintiff's accident, the
15th tee center was approximately 253 feet to the northeast of
the 14th tee.

The 15th tee was approximately 160 feet to the

right of the line of fire of the 14th tee.

The 15th tee was

approximately 40 degrees to the right of the line of fire from
the 14th tee to the 14th green.
ASSUMPTION OF RISK
7.

The layout of the course as it existed at the time

of plaintiff's accident was patent and easily observable by any
person playing the course.
8.

Additionally, a person preparing to tee off on the

15th hole would have previously played the 14th hole and would be
familiar with the proximity and location of the two tees.

,7^

/

9.

The game of golf inherently contains the risk that

golf balls will not travel precisely in the intended course.
Players are aware of these risks and should be alert to the
potential of straying golf balls.

Additionally, golfers are

required to give adequate warnings to other endangered players by
reasonably shouting "fore" when a shot may endanger another
player.
DATED this

day of September, 1987.

WILLIAM ATKIN
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF

)

WILLIAM ATKINr being first duly sworn on oathf deposes
and says that he is a representative of the defendant above
named; that he has read the foregoing Affidavit and knows the
contents thereof; that the same are true of his own knowledge,
except as to matters therein stated upon information and belief,
and as to such matters, believes them to be true.

WILLIAM ATKIN
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me
this

day of September, 1987.

Notary Public
Residing at:

WAS:,:

•;:"::•:!

CC.TY

'C3 FEB 8 PH 1 07
CLE.,.-;

r7:-;:•'¥
]
2
3
4

XlLttf/Jn Je*

FLOYD W HOLM [1522]
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
250 South Main Street
P.O. Box 726
Cedar City, Utah
84720
Telephone:
(801) 586-4404

5
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR

6

WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

7
8

CORY KLATT,

9
10
11
12

Plaintiff,
vs.
IKE THOMAS and JOHN DOE I,
d/b/a SOUTHGATE GOLF COURSE,

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Civil No. 86-1116

Defendants.

13
14

AFFIDAVIT OF
DAVID A. RAINVILLE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF ORANGE
I,

DAVID

)
: ss.
)

A. RAINVILLE, being

first

duly

sworn

upon

oath,

depose and say as follows:
1.

I am a resident of the State of California with offices

in Tustin, Orange County, California.
2.

I

am

presently

self-employed

as

a

designer

consultant for the design of golf courses.
3.

I have 25 years experience as a golf course designer.

4.

I have personally designed or participated in the design

of over 30 golf courses.

25

MBERLAIN
HIGBEE
INEYS AT U W
SOUTH MAIN
O. BOX 726
:OAR C I T Y .

AH 8 « 7 2 0
) 586-4404

anc

43/

1

5.

2

I am a member of the American Society of Golf Course

Architects and have been for five years.

3

6.

4

The American Society of Golf Course Architects

exclusive

5

society.

Membership

is only granted

is an

after the golf

course designer has designed at least five golf courses and has

6

been judged by his peers to be a competent and expert golf course

7

architect.

8

7.

9

In my experience

as a

golf

course

designer anc

architect, I have been called upon and required to determine anc

10

insure that golf courses are designed for the maximum safety oi

11

those who would play on the golf course.

12

8.

13

I have been qualified

in thre*

unrelated court matters and have testified therein concerning th<

34

safety of the design of various golf courses.

15

9.

16

I have been requested by Plaintiff in the above-entitle<

action to render my expert opinion regarding the adequacy of th<

17

design and warnings of Defendant's golf course on or about Apri

18

5, 1986.

19

10.

20

I have relied upon the following information to rende

my opinions:

21

(a)

22

Copies of the deposition transcripts of Mrs. Cor

Klatt and Mr. David Klatt.

23

(b)

24

An aerial

photograph

with

topographical

marking

of the entire golf course, which was taken prior to April 5

25

VMBERLAIN
HIGBEE
RNEY8 AT LAW
SOUTH MAIN
O. BOX 7 2 6
EDAR CITY.
TAH 8 4 7 2 0
t) 586-4404

as an expert witness

1986.

II

/7-

1

(c)

2

An

irrigation

plan

for

the

course

dated

December 18, 1975.

3

(d)

4

fifteenth

5

1987-

6

(e)

An engineer f s drawing of the

fourteenth hole and

tee, which

or

Various

was

prepared

photographs

of

on

the

7

green

8

Plaintiff's counsel in October, 1987.

9

golf

Copies

and

of

fifteenth

all

of

the

tee

of

the

fourteenth

golf

above-referenced

about

course

been

12

herein by this reference.

13

11.

and

by

M r s . Klatt, have

attached hereto as Exhibits "A" through "K" and are

of Mr.

and

the

11

depositions

tee

with

exception

the

27,

taken

materials

10

of

March

incorporated

Based upon the above information and upon my expertise

14

and

15

formed an opinion as to the adequacy and safety of the design and

16

warnings concerning the use of the Southgate Golf Course, whether

17

such

18

Southgate Golf Course and whether such negligence, if any, was a

19

cause of Mrs. Klatt f s injuries.

20

findings and conclusions

21

issues is attached hereto as Exhibit "L" and incorporated herein

22

by this reference.

23

experience

as a golf course designer

inadequacies,

DATED this

if

any,

were

and architect, I have

negligent

on

the

part

of

A copy of a report outlining my

and expert opinion

on the above

stated

£p -* day of February, 1988
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NOTARY PUBLIC - C A L J F O R N I A
PRINCIPAL OFFlCf IN
ORANGE COUNTY
My Commission Exp. Feb. 5, 1989
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

11

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true and correct

12

of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID A. RAINVILLE to Mr. Lowell V.

13

Smith and Mr. Richard K. Glauser, HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH,

14

Attorneys for Defendant Southgate Golf Course, 650 Clark Leaminc

15

Office Center, 175 South West Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101;

16

and to Mr. Wendell E. Bennett, Attorney for Defendant Ike Thomas,

17

448 East 400 South, Suite 304, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; b}

18

first class mail, postage

19

February, 1988.

fully prepaid on this

copy

day o:
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DavidI \ainvi
golf course architect

100 W M a i n St.
Tustin, CA 92680
(714)
838-7200
February 2, 1988
Floyd W. Holm
Chamberlain & Kigbee
Attorneys at Law
P.O. Box 726
250 South Main
Cedar City, Utah 34720

RE:

Klatt v. Southaate Golf Course

Dear Mr. Holm:
I have received the material you provided regarding the fourteenth and
fifteenth holes of the Southgate Golf Course.
The engineer's mapping of the fourteenth hole and the fifteenth tee
compares favorably with ttie aerial photograph provided. I checked
the scale of the maps against indicated distances on the plot map
shown on the engineer's drawing and known standards such as the
tennis courts shown in the photo. I feel confident that my measurements of holes and tees are reasonably accurate, particularly for
the determination of adequate separation.
The following are answers to your specific questions stated in your
letter of November 9, 1987. The questions are restated Tor ease of
comprehension.
1.

Q. Was the golf course, as it existed on April 5, 1986, negligently designed such that it created an unreasonable hazard to
the safety of persons using the golf course?
A. In my opinion, the proximity of the fifteenth tee to the centerline of the fourteenth hole is inadequate and not in keeping with
safe design standards. My measurements indicate a mere 116 feet
from the edge of the fifteenth tee to the centerline of the fourteenth hole. This creates an unreasonable hazard to the persons
using the fifteenth tee.

-1 MEMBER AMERICAN SOCIETY OF GOLF COURSE ARCHITECTS

EXHIBIT
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2.

Q. Could the golf-course have economically erected a fence,
screen, natural barrier or other appropriate barrier between
the fourteenth and fifteenth tees to prevent injury to golfers?
A. The photographs show;, a complete absence of trees separating
holes fourteen and fifteen. Trees are a very economical method
of providing a safety and psychological barrier. Two baffle
fences on the right side of number fourteen tee, one at the front
and one slightly beyond the first one, and fencing of the right
side of fifteen tee could also have been provided. A third
solution would be to simply relocate the fifteenth tee by shortening the hole slightly. Any two of these solutions are well
within economic reason.

3.

Q. Was it feasible for the golf course to provide warning signs,
warning instructions or other appropriate warnings as to the
danger posed by the proximity of the fourteenth and fifteenth
tees?
A. In my opinion, warning signs or instructions are not acceptable solutions and should only be used as supplemental aides to
more positive and physical solutions.
>

4.

Q. Were Mrs. Klatt's injuries caused by the negligence of the
golf course in any one or all of the foregoing respects?
A. My opinion stated in answer to question number one applies
to this question in the respect that holes number fourteen and
fifteen were not designed to safe standards nor were corrective
measures taken in the way of protective fencing and the planting of trees to alleviate the unsafe conditions created by improper separation of the holes in question.

In my opinion, the relationship of holes fourteen and fifteen are
unsafe by design and that a hazardous condition existed for players
on the fifteenth tee.
I would further state that reasonable and economical measures could
have been taken in the way of fencing and planting or relocation of
fifteen tee to correct the design deficiencies. In my opinion, the
design and lack of safety features contributed to the injuries
experienced by Mrs. Klatt.
Respectfully yours,

t

David A. Rainville

DAR/sb
encs.
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From the 14th tee northeasterly toward the 14th green
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EXHIBIT E

From the 14th tee northeasterly toward the 15th tee.
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From approximately 50 yards behind the 14th tee (next
to the road) showing both the 14th green and 15th tee.

EXHIBIT G

From the 15th tec southwesterly toward the 14th tee.
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EXHIBIT H
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-ass;

From the 14th tee northeasterly toward the 15th tee
with a person standing in approximate location of Mrs.
Klatt on the 15th tee.

ri

EXHIBIT I

From approximately 50 yards behind the 14th tee (by the
road) showing both the 14th green and 15th tee, with a
person standing on the 15th tee.
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From the 14th tee northeasterly toward the 14th green
with a person standing on the 14th green.

EXHIBIT K
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From approximately 50 yards behind the 14th tee (by the
road) showing both the 14th green and 15th tee, with a
person standing en the 14th green.
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SNOW, NUFFER, ENGSTROM & DRAKE
A Professional Corporation
90 East 200 North
P.O. Box 400
St. George, Utah 84770
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CORY KLATT,
Plaintiff,

)
)
]I

vs.

IKE THOMAS; JOHN DOE I, dba
]I
SOUTHGATE GOLF COURSE; LAVA
HILLS RESORT CORPORATION,
]
a Utah Corporation; REX JACKSON;
JOHN LaGANT; and JOHN WILLIE,
'
Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT
REX JACKSON'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT;
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

)

Civil No. 86-1116

Defendant Rex Jackson's Motion for Summary Judgment came on before
the Court on Wednesday, the 21st day of December, 1988. Appearing at the
hearing were Thomas M. Higbee, representing the Plaintiff, Cory Klatt; Terry L.
Wade, representing the movant/Defendant, Rex Jackson; Timothy B. Anderson,
representing Defendant, John LaGant; and Paul Graf, representing Defendant,
John Willie. Defendants Southgate Golf Course and Ike Thomas neither appeared
by counsel nor in person; however, Plaintiffs counsel adopted and argued the
position of Defendant Southgate Golf Course as set forth in the latter's
Memorandum in Opposition to Rex Jackson's Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Court first considered the "Objection to Notice of Hearing" filed by
counsel for Defendant Southgate Golf Course respecting Defendant Rex
Jackson's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court determined that proper and
1
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adequate notice of the hearing had been given, and that the hearing on the Motion
for Summary Judgment couid, therefore, go forward.
The Court then considered Plaintiffs counsel's oral objection to the
timeliness of Defendants John LaGant's and John Willie's motions to join in the
Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant Rex Jackson. The Court determined
that said joinder motions were untimely and that the Motion for Summary Judgment
could go forward only as to Defendant Rex Jackson.
The Court then heard oral argument from counsel relative to Defendant Rex
Jackson's Motion for Summary Judgment and, having reviewed the Memorandum
of counsel and the pleadings, affidavits and other material on file with the Court,
determined that there was no just reason for delaying the entry of final judgment as
to Defendant Rex Jackson.
NOW, THEREFORE, being fully advised in the premises, and good cause
appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant Rex
Jackson's Motion for Summary Judgment be, and the same is, granted dismissing
Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, as it relates to Defendant Rex Jackson,
and further, dismissing Defendant Southgate Golf Course's Cross-Claim against
Defendant Rex Jackson. The Court finds, as the basis for its Order, the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That Plaintiff, Cory Klatt, was injured as the result of an accident

which occurred on April 5, 1986, while Plaintiff was playing golf at the Southgate
Golf Course in St. George, Utah.

That the said accident occurred when

Defendant, Ike Thomas, aiming for the fourteenth green, sliced a shot from the
fourteenth tee area and struck Plaintiff, who was standing in the fifteenth tee area.

2
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2.

That at the time of the accident involving Plaintiff, Defendant

Southgate Golf Course (hereinafter "Defendant Southgate") was the owner of the
golf course and had complete possession and control thereof.
3.

That Defendant Southgate had purchased the subject golf course

approximately eleven months prior to the accident involving Plaintiff, in May,
1985, from Defendant Lava Hills Resort Corporation (hereinafter "Defendant Lava
Hills").
4.

That Defendant Rex Jackson (hereinafter "Defendant Jackson") had

been an officer and shareholder in Defendant Lava Hills from the time of its
incorporation on or about December 9, 1975, until the sale to Defendant
Southgate in May, 1985, at which time he sold his entire interest in the golf course
to Defendant Southgate, and the latter purchased the remaining assets of
Defendant Lava Hills. That since the time Defendant Jackson relinquished his
interest in Defendant Lava Hills and in the golf course in May, 1985, he has not
exercised any control whatsoever over the golf course.
5.

That although the Southgate Golf Course (originally known as Lava

Hills Golf Course) was originally designed and constructed during the ownership
of Defendant Lava Hills, soon after purchasing the golf course, Defendant
Southgate sold the particular segment of the golf course property whereon the
original fourteenth hole, as designed and constructed during Lava Hills'
ownership, had been located, and in October of 1985, constructed a new
fourteenth hole approximately 130 feet to the Northwest.
6.

That the acts of negligence alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint involved

the new fourteenth hole designed and constructed by Defendant Southgate and
the existing fifteenth hole of the golf course.
7.

That on the date of the accident the fourteenth hole of the golf course

was in a different location than the fourteenth hole as constructed during
3
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Defendant Lava Hills' ownership and as shown on the original design maps for the
Lava Hills Golf Course, it having been changed by Defendant Southgate in
October of 1985.

Furthermore, the direction or angle of the 14th tee box was

materially different on the date of the accident than it had been during the
ownership of Defendant Lava Hills.
8.

That at the time of the accident, neither Plaintiff nor Defendant

Thomas were following the original design and construction of the golf course as it
had been when it was under the control of Defendant Lava Hills, at least with
respect to the fourteenth hole.
9.

That during the approximately ten years the golf course was owned

and operated by Defendant Lava Hills, there were no major accidents on the golf
course, and specifically none involving the fourteenth or fifteenth holes. During
those approximate ten years the fourteenth and fifteenth holes were located
according to the golf course's original design and construction. While under the
control of Defendant Lava Hills, the fourteenth hole was never in the location it
was in on April 5, 1986, the date of the accident.
10.

That even if the fourteenth and fifteenth holes of the subject golf

course, as designed and constructed during the ownership of Defendant Lava
Hills, were defective or unsafe at the time Defendant Southgate purchased the golf
course (and this Court makes no such finding at this juncture), such defect could
have been discovered by Defendant Southgate through such an inspection as
would be made in the exercise of ordinary care and prudence, and Defendant
Southgate had a reasonable time to discover and remedy any such defect or
dangerous condition prior to the occurrence of Plaintiffs accident.
11.

That Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Rex Jackson (hereinafter

"Defendant Jackson") of negligence in the design of the golf course is barred
under the doctrine of Res Judicata in that:
4
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(a)

said claim involves the same parties as it did when it was

previously raised in Plaintiffs Amended Complaint;
(b)

the Court entered a final judgment on the merits as to this claim

against Defendant Jackson when it granted Summary Judgment in an
Order dated September 6, 1988; and
(c)

the said prior adjudication involved the same claim of

negligent design against Defendant Rex Jackson as that presently
raised in Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint.
12.

That the Court's "Order Granting Summary Judgment," dated

September 6, 1988, aforedescribed, was a final adjudication on the merits in that it
did expressly determine that there was no just reason for delay in entry of final
judgment as to Defendant Jackson, as required by Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Defendant Jackson is entitled to Summary Judgment, dismissing,

with prejudice, Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, as it relates to him, and
further, dismissing, with prejudice, Defendant Southgate's Cross-Claim against
him.
2.

Defendant Jackson's entitlement to Judgment, as aforenoted, is

based upon the general rule of law, which is stated thus in the Restatement
Second of Torts, Section 352:
Except as stated in Section 353, a vendor of land is not subject to
liability for physical harm caused to his vendee or others while upon
the land after the vendee has taken possession by any dangerous
condition, whether natural or artificial, which existed at the time that
the vendee took possession.
The exceptions to this general rule, as noted in Section 353, Restatement Second
of Torts, do not apply under the facts of this case.

5
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3.

As a further legal basis for Defendant Jackson's entitlement to

Judgment, as aforenoted, the Court adopts the reasoning set forth in the case of
Preston v. Goldman. 42 Cal.3d 108, 227 Cal.Rptr. 817 (1986), and deems said
case to be dispositive hereof.
MADE AND ENTERED this 5 & ~ d a y

o f ^ ^ ~ ~ c ^

BY THE COURT:
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District Court Jaage
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

day of December, 1988, I served

an unsigned copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT REX
JACKSON'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW on each of the following by depositing a copy in the U.S.
Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to:
Floyd W. Holm, Esq.
CHAMBERLAIN & HlGBEE

250 South Main Street
P.O. Box 726
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Richard K. Glauser, Esq.
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH

4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P.O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970
Paul F. Graf, Esq.
220 North 200 East
St. George, Utah 84770
Timothy B. Anderson, Esq.
JONES, W A L D O , HOLBROOK & M C D O N O U G H

249 East Tabernacle, Suite 200
St. George, Utah 84770

,

w
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
hereby certify that on the

/ ^

day of < ^

1989, I served a signed copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT
REX JACKSON'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW on each of the following by depositing a copy in
the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to:
Floyd W. Holm, Esq.
CHAMBERLAIN & H I G B E E

250 South Main Street
P.O. Box 726
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Richard K. Glauser, Esq.
H A N S O N , EPPERSON & SMITH

4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P.O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970
Paul F. Graf, Esq.
220 North 200 East
St. George, Utah 84770
Timothy B. Anderson, Esq.
J O N E S , W A L D O , HOLBROOK & M C D O N O U G H

249 East Tabernacle, Suite 200
St. George, Utah 84770
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CORY KLATT,
Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)
)

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

IKE THOMAS; JOHN DOE I, dba
)
SOUTHGATE GOLF COURSE; LAVA
HILLS RESORT CORPORATION,
)
a Utah Corporation; REX JACKSON;
JOHN LaGANT; and JOHN WILLIE,
)
Defendants.

)

Civil No. 86-1116

Defendant Rex Jackson's Motion for Summary Judgment came on before
the Court on Wednesday, the 21st day of December, 1988.

Appearing at the

hearing were Thomas M. Higbee, representing the Plaintiff, Cory Klatt; Terry L.
Wade, representing the movant/Defendant, Rex Jackson; Timothy B. Anderson,
representing Defendant, John LaGant; and Paul Graf, representing Defendant,
John Willie. Defendants Southgate Golf Course and Ike Thomas neither appeared
by counsel nor in person; however, Plaintiff's counsel adopted and argued the
position of Defendant Southgate Golf Course as set forth in the latter's
Memorandum in Opposition to Rex Jackson's Motion for Summary Judgment. The
Court, having heard oral argument from counsel and having considered and
reviewed the memoranda of counsel, as well as the pleadings, affidavits, and
other material on file with the Court, and having heretofore made and entered its
1
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and thus being fully advised in the
premises,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that no just reason
exists for delaying the entry of final judgment as to Defendant Rex Jackson, and
therefore, the tatter's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted dismissing,
with prejudice, Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, as it relates to Defendant Rex
Jackson, and further, dismissing, with prejudice, Defendant Southgate Golf Course's
Cross-Claim against Defendant Rex Jackson.
DATED this

of C\*^^*~>

198_2_.

CJ2^&X—

J.^HILIP EVE!
fstrict Court Judge
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

day of December, 1988, I served

an unsigned copy of the foregoing SUMMARY JUDGMENT on each of the
following by depositing a copy in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to:
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970

Floyd W. Holm, Esq.
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE

250 South Main Street
P.O. Box 726
Cedar City, Utah 84720

Paul F. Graf, Esq.
220 North 200 East
St. George, Utah 84770

Richard K. Glauser, Esq.

Timothy B. Anderson, Esq.

H A N S O N , EPPERSON & SMITH

J O N E S , W A L D O , HOLBROOK &

4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P.O. Box 2970

249 East Tabernacle, Suite 200
St. George, Utah 84770
Secretary
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

1^

day of c jieJ^UiMM^-—,

,

1989, I served a signed copy of the foregoing SUMMARY JUDGMENT on each of
the following by depositing a copy in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed
to:
Floyd W. Holm, Esq.
CHAMBERLAIN & H I G B E E

250 South Main Street
P.O. Box 726
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Richard K. Glauser, Esq.
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH

4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P.O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970
Paul F. Graf, Esq.
220 North 200 East
St. George, Utah 84770
Timothy B. Anderson, Esq.
J O N E S , W A L D O , HOLBBOOK & M C D O N O U G H

249 East Tabernacle, Suite 200
St. George, Utah 84770
Secretary
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LOWELL V. SMITH, #3006
RICHARD K. GLAUSER, #4324
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
A Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Defendants
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P. 0. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970
Telephone: (801) 363-7611
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CORY KLATT,
I
Plaintiff,

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW UNDERLYING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
IKE THOMAS; JOHN DOE I, dba
SOUTHGATE GOLF COURSE; LAVA
HILLS RESORT CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation; REX JACKSON;
JOHN LAGANT; and JOHN WILLIE,
Defendants.

Civil No.:
J

86-1116

Judge J. Philip Eves

Plaintiffs motion to vacate the summary judgment
entered in favor of Rex Jackson, defendant John Willie's motion
for summary judgment, defendant John LaGant's motion for summary
judgment, and plaintiff's request for oral argument on defendant
Southgate's motion for summary judgment all came on regularly for
hearing on the 6th day of February, 1989.

Plaintiff was

represented by counsel, Floyd W. Holm.

Rex Jackson was

represented by counsel, Terry L. Wade.

Defendant, John Willie,

was represented by counsel Paul F. Graf and David L. Watson.

A St.

Defendant, John LaGant was represented by cbunsel Timothy B.
Anderson.

Defendant Southgate was represented by counsel,

Richard K. Glauser.

The court having reviewed all memoranda,

affidavits and other relevant documents on file and having heard
argument of counsel and being fully advised in the premises, now
makes and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO VACATE SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF REX JACKSON
1.

The action against Rex Jackson is barred by the

statute of repose for injury due to defective design or
construction of improvements to real property contained in
Section 78-12-25.5 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
2.

The actions against Rex Jackson failed to state a

cause of action based upon the principal set forth in Preston v.
Goldman, 77 P.2d 476 (Cal. 1986).
3.

There are no grounds to vacate the summary judgment

previously entered in favor of Rex Jackson,
JOHN WILLIE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1.

The action against John Willie is barred by the

statute of repose for injury due to defective design or
construction of improvements to real property contained in
Section 78-12-25.5 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
2

2.

The actions against John Willie failed to state a

cause of action based upon the principal set forth in Preston v,
Goldman, 77 P.2d 476 (Cal. 1986).
3.

John Willie is entitled to summary judgment as a

matter of law.
JOHN LAGANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1.

The action against John LaGant is barred by the

statute of repose for injury due to defective design or
construction of improvements to real property contained in
Section 78-12-25-5 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

2.

The actions against John LaGant failed to state a

cause of action based upon the principal set forth in Preston v<
Goldman, 77 P.2d 476 (Cal. 1986).
3.

John LaGant is entitled to summary judgment as a

matter of law.
SOUTHGATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1.

Pi

pursuant to Rule 2.8(gJ
and Ci

MC

I i.

Plaintiff has failed to show any evidence that

defendant knew or should have known of any defect on the golf
course.
%&-.

Southgate is entitled to summary judgment as a

matter of law.

DATED this ^^

*

day of

~2U^l^c^

, 1989.

3LE J. BHILIP EVES
Lstrict Couiw: Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, this \~1

day of March, 1989, a true and correct copy

of the foregoing, to the following:
Floyd W. Holm
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE
250 South Main Street
P. O. Box 726
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Terry L. Wade
Kory D. Staheli
SNOW, NUFFER, ENGSTROM & DRAKE
90 East 200 North
P. 0- Box 400
St. George, Utah 84770
David L. Watson
650 East 500 South
St. George, Utah 84770
Paul F. Graf
P. O. Box 1637
St. George, Utah

84770-1637

Timothy B. Anderson
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
249 East Tabernacle
St. George, Utah 84770
Original mailed to;
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT CLERK
220 North 200 East
St. George, Utah 84770
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LOWELL V. SMITH, #3006
RICHARD K. GLAUSER, #4324
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
A Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Defendants
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P. 0. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970
Telephone: (801) 363-7611
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CORY KLATT,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
IKE THOMAS; JOHN DOE I, dba
SOUTHGATE GOLF COURSE; LAVA
HILLS RESORT CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation; REX JACKSON;
JOHN LAGANT; and JOHN WILLIE,
Defendants.

Civil No.:

86-1116

Judge J. Philip Eves

Plaintiff's motion to vacate the summary judgment
previously rendered in favor of Rex Jackson, defendant
John Willie's motion for summary judgment, defendant
John LaGant's motion for summary judgment, and a request for oral
argument on defendant Southgate's motion for summary judgment,
all came on regularly for hearing on the 6th day of February,
1989, before the Honorable J. Philip Eves.
represented by counsel, Floyd W. Holm.

Plaintiff was

Defendant, Southgate Golf

Course, was represented by counsel, Richard K. Glauser.

^VJ

Defendant, John Willie, was represented by counsel, Paul Graf and
David L. Watson.

Defendant, Rex Jackson, was represented by

counsel, Terry L. Wade,

Defendant, John LaGant, was represented

by counsel, Timothy B. Anderson,
The court having read and reviewed all of the pleadings
relevant to the respective motions and having heard argument from
all counsel of record and being fully advised in the premises and
having previously entered its findings of fact and conclusions of
law, now;
HEREBY ORDERS as follows:
1.

Plaintiff's motion to vacate the summary judgment

rendered in favor of defendant, Rex Jackson, is hereby denied,
2.

Defendant John Willie's motion for summary judgment

is hereby granted;
3.

Defendant John LaGant's motion for summary judgment

is hereby granted;
4.

Defendant Southgate's motion for summary judgment

is hereby granted.
5.

The court notes that defendant, Ike Thomas, has

previously settled in entirety with the plaintiff and the
plaintiff agreed to give to all other parties credit for the
amount paid by defendant, Ike Thomas, or the percentage of
negligence attributable to Ike Thomas, if any, whichever is
2

M4

greater.

Therefore, the complaint against Ike Thomas and any and

all other cross-claims against Ike Thomas are hereby dismissed.
6.

The court notes that defendant, Lava Hills Resort

Corporation, has not ever appeared or otherwise been subject to
the jurisdiction of this court.
7.

Since this order disposes of all claims with regard

to all parties over which

this

court

has

jurisdiction, the trial

date of March 9 and 10, 1989, is moot and is hereby vacated.
Likewise, Southgate's motion to compel and motion in limine
regarding insurance are moot and the court makes no determination
thereon.

Although this court is not aware of any pending claims

regarding parties within the jurisdiction of this court which are
not disposed of by this order, the court expressly finds that
there is no just reason for delay and that this order shall
become final upon entry pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules
A

of Civil Procedure.
DATED this

~Z

day of flA^^-^O*^

, 1989.

a^st4—
ORABLE J. PHILIP EVES
xstrict Courty Judge

MS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, this ^ 1 ^ ^ " day of February, 1989, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing, to the following:
Floyd W. Holm
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE
250 South Main Street
P. 0. Box 726
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Terry L. Wade
Kory D. Staheli
SNOW, NUFFER, ENGSTROM & DRAKE
90 East 200 North
P. O. Box 400
St- George, Utah 84770
David L. Watson
650 East 500 South
St. George, Utah 8477 0
Paul F. Graf
P. O. Box 1637
St- George, Utah

84770-1637

Timothy B. Anderson
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
249 East Tabernacle
St. George, Utah 8477 0
Original mailed to:
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT CLERK
220 North 200 East
St. George, Utah 84770
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